

**ETH** zürich



ALMA MATER STUDIORUM  
UNIVERSITÀ DI BOLOGNA



**UNSW**  
SYDNEY



# Hardware Support for Time Protection

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**Nils Wistoff**

nwistoff@iis.ee.ethz.ch

**Gernot Heiser**

gernot@unsw.edu.au

**Luca Benini**

lbenini@iis.ee.ethz.ch

**PULP Platform**

Open Source Hardware, the way it should be!



@pulp\_platform

pulp-platform.org

youtube.com/pulp\_platform

# Team of 100 people in ETH Zürich – University of Bologna



- **Research on open-source energy-efficient computing**



# PULP open-source hardware ecosystem



## RISC-V Cores and Vector Units

<b>RI5CY</b> <i>CV32E</i>	<b>Zero R</b> <i>lbex</i>	<b>Snitch</b>	<b>Spatz</b>	<b>Ariane</b> <i>CVA6</i>	<b>Ara</b>
RV32	RV32	RV32	RVV	RV64	RVV


## Peripherals

<b>JTAG</b>	<b>SPI</b>
<b>UART</b>	<b>I2S</b>
<b>DMA</b>	<b>GPIO</b>

## Interconnects


<b>LIC</b>	<b>HCI</b>
<b>APB</b>	<b>FlooNoC</b>
<b>AXI4</b>	

## Platforms




### Single core

- PULPino, PULPissimo
- Cheshire



### Multi-core

- OpenPULP
- ControlPULP



### Heterogeneous, Many-core

- Hero, Carfield, Astral
- Occamy, Mempoool

## IOT

### Accelerators and ISA extensions

<b>XpulpNN,</b> <b>XpulpTNN</b>	<b>ITA</b> <b>(Transformers)</b>	<b>RBE, NEUREKA</b> <b>(QNNs)</b>	<b>FFT</b> <b>(DSP)</b>	<b>(FP-Tensor)</b>
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## HPC

 [github.com/pulp-platform](https://github.com/pulp-platform)

# In 11 years PULP team has designed more than 60 chips



# Spectre: Exploiting timing channels to leak data [1]



Science & technology

The chips are down

## Two security flaws in modern chips cause big headaches for the tech business

Fixing the underlying problems will take a long time



Alamy


Jan 4th 2018

IT WAS a one-two punch for the computer industry. January 3rd saw the disclosure of two serious flaws in the design of the processors that power most of the world's computers. The first, appropriately called Meltdown, affects only chips made by Intel, and makes it possible to dissolve the virtual walls between the digital memory used by different programs, allowing hackers to steal sensitive data, such as passwords or a computer's encryption keys. The second,

ANDY GREENBERG SECURITY 01.03.2018 03:00 PM

## A Critical Intel Flaw Breaks Basic Security for Most Computers

A Google-led team of researchers has found a critical chip flaw that developers are scrambling to patch in millions of computers.



# SPECTRE

Speculative  
Execution  
+  
Timing Channel



MICROSOFT TECH INTEL

## Intel's processors have a security bug and the fix could slow down PCs



By Tom Warren | @tomwarren | Jan 3, 2018, 8:45am EST

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[1] Kocher et al., *Spectre Attacks: Exploiting Speculative Execution*, IEEE S&P 2019




# Timing channel




SW needs to know of all HW components and how to partition them

# Spatial and temporal partitioning



\* Terminology adopted from the RISC-V CBQRI extension

# Partitioning a system on chip






# Partitioning the CPU





CVA6: 64-bit, application-class, 6-stage, in-order RISC-V core



fence.t  
[TCOMP'23]



Negligible HW costs



L1D Unmitigated



L1D fence.t




Closes all observed timing channels

M = 1667.3 mb, M<sub>0</sub> = 0.5 mb


M = 21.7 mb, M<sub>0</sub> = 27.8 mb

Splash-2 Benchmark Overhead (%)




■ write-back L1   ■ write-through L1


# Partitioning the CPU



OpenC910: 64-bit, application-class, **12-stage**, **superscalar**, **out-of-order** RISC-V core







Chen et al., ISCA'20




**fence.t.s**  
[ApplePies'24]

Negligible HW costs



# Partitioning the interconnect




Can be avoided through coscheduling

Challenges:

- Cores compete for **bandwidth**
- Interconnect contains **state** (e.g. arbiters)

Flush on context switch


Work-in-progress



# Partitioning the last-level cache




- **Cache controller** state comprises a **single capacity unit**
- HW prototype implemented, system integration/evaluation ongoing




Augment set index with RCID\*

Temporal partitioning



Flush before reallocating




\* Terminology adopted from the RISC-V CBQRI extension

# Partitioning DRAM




Clear any state that might leak (scheduler, arbiters, ...)




Precharge when reallocating


Work-in-progress



# AutoCC: A formal tool to find timing channels [MICRO'23]



Generate SystemVerilog assertions to formally verify non-interference




PRINCETON UNIVERSITY





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Identified and fixed three counterexamples in CVA6

[github.com/morenes/AutoCC](https://github.com/morenes/AutoCC) 

# Carfield: Automotive platform for MCS



Partitionable LLC

Constant-time off-chip memory

CVA6 with fence.t



# Conclusion

- Closing timing channels requires **HW/SW co-design**.
- By exposing HW partitioning mechanisms, all **on-core timing channels can be closed** at **minimal performance** impact (1.0%) and **negligible hardware overhead**.
- Proven **empirically** on seL4, using **formal** verification, and in **silicon**!
- DRAM and interconnect still under investigation
  - further need for HW/SW co-design expected.
- To be specified in RISC-V



Microarchitecture Side Channels Special Interest Group  
Timing Fences Task Group





**Nils Wistoff**

**Gernot Heiser**

**Luca Benini**

nwistoff@iis.ee.ethz.ch

gernot@unsw.edu.au

lbenini@iis.ee.ethz.ch



**Institut für Integrierte Systeme – ETH Zürich**

Gloriastrasse 35

Zürich, Switzerland

**DEI – Università di Bologna**

Viale del Risorgimento 2

Bologna, Italy