



The seL4 Foundation

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# The seL4<sup>®</sup> Microkernel An Introduction

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## Abstract

This whitepaper provides an introduction to and overview of seL4. We explain what seL4 is (and is not) and explore its defining features. We explain what makes seL4 uniquely qualified as the operating-system kernel of choice for security- and safety-critical systems, and generally embedded and cyber-physical systems. In particular, we explain seL4's assurance story, its security- and safety-relevant features, and its benchmark-setting performance. We also discuss typical usage scenarios, including incremental cyber retrofit of legacy systems.

## CCS Concepts

- Software and its engineering → Operating Systems
- Security and privacy → Systems security
- Security and privacy → Formal methods and theory of security
- Computer systems organization → Real-time systems → Real-time operating systems
- Computer systems organization → Real-time systems → Dependable and fault-tolerant systems and networks

## Keywords

seL4, microkernel, performance

## Reference Format:

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# Chapter 1

## What Is seL4?

### seL4 is an operating system microkernel

An [operating system](#) (OS) is the low-level system software that controls a computer system's resources and enforces security. Unlike application software, the OS has exclusive access to a more privileged execution mode of the processor (*kernel mode*) that gives it direct access to hardware. Applications only ever execute in *user mode* and can only access hardware as permitted by the OS.

An OS [microkernel](#) is a minimal core of an OS, reducing the code executing at higher privilege to a minimum. seL4 is a member of the [L4 family of microkernels](#) that goes back to the mid-1990s. (And no, *seL4 has nothing to do with seLinux.*)

### seL4 is also a hypervisor

seL4 supports virtual machines that can run a fully fledged guest OS such as Linux. Subject to seL4's enforcement of communication channels, guests and their applications can communicate with each other as well as with native applications.

Learn more about what it means that seL4 is a microkernel and its use as a hypervisor in [Chapter 2](#). And learn about real-world deployment scenarios, including approaches for retrofitting security into legacy systems in [Chapter 7](#).

### seL4 is proved correct

seL4 comes with a formal, mathematical, machine-checked *proof of implementation correctness*, meaning the kernel is in a very strong sense "bug free" with respect to its specification. In fact, seL4 is the world's first OS kernel with such a proof at the code level [[Klein et al., 2009](#)].

### seL4 is provably secure

Besides implementation correctness, seL4 comes with further proofs of *security enforcement* [[Klein et al., 2014](#)]. They say that in a correctly configured seL4-based system, the kernel guarantees the classical security properties of *confidentiality, integrity and availability*. More about these proofs in [Chapter 3](#).

### seL4 improves security with fine-grained access control through capabilities

[Capabilities](#) are access tokens which support very fine-grained control over which entity can access a particular resource in a system. They support strong security according to the [principle of least privilege](#) (also called principle of least authority,

POLA). This is a core design principle of highly secure system, and is impossible to achieve with the way access control happens in mainstream systems such as Linux or Windows.

seL4 is still the *world's only OS that is both capability-based and formally verified*, and as such has a defensible claim of being the world's most secure OS. More about capabilities in [Chapter 4](#).

### **seL4 ensures safety of time-critical systems**

seL4 is the world's only OS kernel (at least in the open literature) that has undergone a complete and sound analysis of its *worst-case execution time* (WCET) [[Blackham et al., 2011](#), [Sewell et al., 2017](#)]. This means, if the kernel is configured appropriately, all kernel operations are bounded in time, and the bound is known. This is a prerequisite for building *hard real-time systems*, where failure to react to an event within a strictly bounded time period is catastrophic.

### **seL4 is the world's most advanced mixed-criticality OS**

seL4 provides strong support for [mixed criticality real-time systems](#) (MCS), where the timeliness of critical activities must be ensured even if they co-exist with less trusted code executing on the same platform. seL4 achieves this with a flexible model that retains good resource utilisation, unlike the more established MCS OSes that use strict (and inflexible) time and space partitioning [[Lyons et al., 2018](#)]. More on seL4's real-time and MCS support in [Chapter 5](#).

### **seL4 is the world's fastest microkernel**

Traditionally, systems are either (sort-of) secure, or they are fast. seL4 is unique in that it is both. seL4 is designed to support a wide range of real-world use cases, whether they are security- (or safety-)critical or not, and excellent performance is a requirement. More on seL4's performance in [Chapter 6](#).

### **seL4 is pronounced "ess-e-ell-four"**

The pronunciation "sell-four" is deprecated.

## **How to read this document**

This document is meant to be approachable by a wide audience. However, for completeness, we will add some deeper technical detail in places.



Such detail will be marked with a chilli, like the one on the left. If you see this then you know you can safely skip the marked passage if you think the technical description is too "spicy" for your taste, or if you are simply not interested in this level of detail. Only other chillied passages will assume you have read it.



### **Technical section**

Where the chilli appears in a section title, such as here, this indicates that the whole section is fairly technical and can be skipped.

# Chapter 2

## seL4 Is a Microkernel and a Hypervisor, It Is Not an OS

### 2.1 Monolithic kernels vs microkernels

To understand the difference between a mainstream OS, such as Linux, and a microkernel, such as seL4, let's look at [Figure 2.1](#).




Figure 2.1: Operating-system structure: Monolithic kernel (left) vs microkernel (right).

The left side presents a (fairly abstracted) view of the architecture of a system such as Linux. The yellow part is the OS *kernel*, it offers services such as file storage and networking to applications. All the code that implements those services executes in the *privileged mode* of the hardware, also called *kernel mode* or *supervisor mode* – the execution mode that has unfettered access and control of all resources in the system. In contrast, applications run in unprivileged, or *user mode*, and do not have direct access to many hardware resources, which must be accessed through the OS. The OS is internally structured in a number of layers, where each layer provides abstractions implemented by layers below.

The problem with privileged-mode code is that it is dangerous: If anything goes wrong here, there's nothing to stop the damage. In particular, if this code has a bug that can be exploited by an attacker to run the attacker's code in privileged mode (called a privilege-escalation or arbitrary code-execution attack) then the attacker can do what they want with the system. Such flaws are the root problem of the many system compromises we experience in mainstream systems.

Of course, software bugs are mostly a fact of life, and OSes are not different. For example, the Linux kernel comprises of the order of 20 million lines of source code (20 MSLOC); we can estimate that it contains literally tens of thousands of bugs [Biggs et al., 2018]. This is obviously a huge attack surface! This idea is captured by saying that Linux has a large *trusted computing base* (TCB), which is defined as the subset of the overall system that must be trusted to operate correctly for the system to be secure.

The idea behind a microkernel design is to drastically reduce the TCB and thus the attack surface. As schematically shown at the right of Figure 2.1, the kernel, i.e. the part of the system executing in privileged mode, is much smaller. In a well-designed microkernel, such as seL4, it is of the order of ten thousand lines of source code (10 kSLOC). This is literally three orders of magnitude smaller than the Linux kernel, and the attack surface shrinks accordingly (maybe more, as the density of bugs probably grows more than linearly with code size).

Obviously, it is not possible to provide the same functionality, in terms of OS services, in such a small code base. In fact, the microkernel provides almost no services: it is just a thin wrapper around hardware, just enough to securely multiplex hardware resources. What the microkernel mostly provides is isolation, sandboxes in which programs can execute without interference from other programs. And, critically, it provides a *protected procedure call* mechanism, for historic reasons called *IPC*. This allows one program to securely call a function in a different program, where the microkernel transports function inputs and outputs between the programs and, importantly, enforces interfaces: the “remote” (contained in a different sandbox) function can only be called at an exported entrypoint, and only by explicitly authorised clients (who have been given the appropriate capability, see Chapter 4).



For a deeper explanation of what seL4 IPC is and is not, I recommend reading my blog [How to \(and how not to\) use seL4 IPC](#).

The microkernel system uses this approach to provide the services the monolithic OS implements in the kernel. In the microkernel world, these services are just programs, no different from applications, that run in their own sandboxes, and provide an IPC interface for applications to call. Should a server be compromised, that compromise is confined to the server, its sandbox protects the rest of the system. This is in stark contrast to the monolithic case, where a compromise of an OS service compromises the complete system.

This effect can be quantified: Our recent study shows that of the known Linux compromises classified as *critical*, i.e. most severe, 29% would be fully eliminated by a microkernel design, and another 55% would be mitigated enough to no longer qualify as critical [Biggs et al., 2018].

## 2.2 seL4 Is a microkernel, not an OS

seL4 is a microkernel, and designed for generality while minimising the TCB. It is a member of the L4 microkernel family, which goes back to the mid-'90s; Figure 2.2 shows seL4's provenance. It was developed by our group at UNSW/NICTA, these days known as Trustworthy Systems (TS). At the time we had 15 years of experience in developing high-performance microkernels, and a track-record of real-world deployments: Our




Figure 2.2: L4 microkernel family tree.

*OKL4 Microkernel* shipped on billions of Qualcomm cellular modem chips, and our *L4-embedded* kernel from the mid-Noughties runs on the secure enclave of all recent iOS devices (iPhones etc).

Being a microkernel, seL4 contains none of the usual OS services; such services are provided by programs running in user mode. Besides the great advantages elaborated above, there are downsides to the microkernel design: These components must come from somewhere. Some can be ported from open-source OSes, such as FreeBSD or Linux, or they can be written from scratch. But in any case, this is significant work.

To scale up we need the help of the community, and the seL4 Foundation is the key mechanism for enabling the community to cooperate and develop or port such services for seL4-based systems. The most important ones are device drivers, network protocol stacks, and file systems. [We have a fair number of these](#), but much more is needed.

An important enabler is a component framework; it allows developers to focus on the code that implements the services, and automates much of the system integration. There are presently two main component frameworks for seL4, both open source: CAMkES and Genode.

[CAMkES](#) is a framework that is aimed at embedded and cyber-physical systems, which typically have a static architecture, meaning they consist of a defined set of components that does not change once the system has fully booted up.

[Genode](#) is in many ways a more powerful and general framework, that supports multiple microkernels and already comes with a wealth of services and device drivers, especially for x86 platforms. It is arguably more convenient to work with than CAMkES, and is certainly the way to get a complex system up quickly. However, Genode has drawbacks: 1. As it supports multiple microkernels, not all as powerful as seL4, Genode is based on the least common denominator. In particular, it cannot use all of seL4's security and safety features. 2. It has no assurance story. More on this in [Section 3.2](#).

## 2.3 seL4 is also a hypervisor

seL4 is a microkernel, but it is also a hypervisor: It is possible to run virtual machines on seL4, and inside the virtual machine (VM) a mainstream OS, such as Linux.





Figure 2.3: Using virtualisation to integrate native OS services with Linux-provided services.

This enables an alternative way of provisioning system services, by having a Linux VM provide them. Such a setup is shown in [Figure 2.3](#), which shows how some services are borrowed from multiple Linux instances running as guest OSes in separate VMs.

In this example, we provide two system services: networking and storage. Networking is provided by a native protocol stack running directly on seL4, lwIP or PicoTCP are frequently used stacks. Instead of porting a network driver, we borrow one from Linux, by running a VM with a stripped-down Linux guest that has little more than the NIC driver. The protocol stack communicates with Linux via an seL4-provided channel, and the application similarly obtains network services by communicating with the protocol stack. Note that in the setup shown in the figure, the application has no channel to the NIC-driver VM, and thus cannot communicate with it directly, only via the NW stack; this is enabled by seL4’s capability-based protection (see [Chapter 4](#)).

A similar setup is shown for the storage service; this time the file system is a Linux one running in a VM, while the storage driver is native. Again, communication between the components is limited to the minimum channels required. In particular, the app cannot talk to the storage driver (except through the file system), and the two Linux systems cannot communicate with each other.

 When used as a hypervisor, seL4 runs in the appropriate hypervisor mode (EL2 on Arm, Root Ring-0 on x86, HS on RISC-V), which is a higher privilege level than the guest operating system. Just as when running as the OS kernel, it only does the minimum work that has to be performed in the privileged (hypervisor) mode and leaves everything else to user mode.

Specifically this means that seL4 performs *world switches*, meaning it switches virtual machine state when a VM’s execution time is up, or VMs must be switched for some other reason. It also catches virtualisation exceptions (“VM exits” in Intel lingo) and forwards them to a user-level handler, called the *virtual machine monitor*






Figure 2.4: seL4 virtualisation support with usermode VMMs.

(VMM). The VMM is then responsible for performing any emulation operations needed.

Each VM has its private copy of the VMM, isolated from the guest OS as well as from other VMs, as shown in Figure 2.4. This means that the VMM cannot break isolation, and is therefore not more trusted than the guest OS itself. In particular, this means that there is no need to verify the VMM, as that would not add real assurance as long as the guest OS, typically Linux, is not verified.

## 2.4 seL4 is not seLinux

Many people confuse seL4 with seLinux (probably because seL4 might be mistaken as a shorthand for the 4<sup>th</sup> version of seLinux). Fact is that seL4 has nothing whatsoever to do with seLinux, other than both being open source. They share no code nor abstractions. seLinux is not a microkernel, it is a security policy framework built into Linux. While in some ways more secure than standard Linux, seLinux suffers from the same problem as standard Linux: a huge TCB, and correspondingly huge attack surface. In other words, seLinux is an add-on to a fundamentally insecure operating system and thus remains fundamentally insecure. In contrast, seL4 provides bullet-proof isolation from the ground up.

In short, seLinux is not suitable for truly security-critical uses, while seL4 is designed for them.

# Chapter 3

## seL4's Verification Story

In 2009, seL4 became the world's first OS kernel with a machine-checked functional correctness proof at the source-code level. This proof was 200,000 lines of proof script at the time, one of the largest ever (we think it was the second largest then). It showed that a functionally correct OS kernel is possible, something that until then had been considered infeasible.

Since then we have extended the scope of the verification to higher level properties, [Figure 3.1](#) shows the chain of proofs, which are explained below. Importantly, we maintained the proof with the ongoing evolution of the kernel: Commits to the mainline kernel source are only allowed if they do not break proofs, otherwise the proofs are updated as well. This *proof engineering* is also a novelty. Our seL4 proofs constitute by far the largest proof base that is actively maintained. The set of proofs has by now grown to well over a million lines, most of this manually written and then machine checked.





Figure 3.1: seL4's proof chain.

## 3.1 Correctness and security enforcement

### Functional correctness

The core of seL4's verification is the functional correctness proof, which says that the C implementation is free of implementation defects. More precisely, there is a formal specification of the kernel's functionality, expressed in a mathematical language called *higher-order logic* (HOL). This is represented by the box labelled *abstract model* in the figure. The functional correctness proof then says that the C implementation is a *refinement* of the abstract model, meaning the possible behaviours of the C code are a subset of those allowed by the abstract model.

 This informal description glosses over a lot of detail. Here is some of it in case you wonder.

C is not a formal language; in order to allow reasoning about a C program in the theorem prover (we use Isabelle/HOL), it has to be transformed into mathematical logic (HOL). This is done by a C parser written in Isabelle. The parser defines the semantics of the C program, and gives it meaning in HOL according to this semantics. It is this formalisation which we prove to be a refinement of the mathematical (abstract) model.

Note that C does not have an official mathematical semantics, and parts of the C language are notoriously subtle and not necessarily that well defined. We solve this by restricting our use of C to a well-defined subset of the language, for which we have an unambiguous semantics. However, this does not guarantee that our assumed semantics for that subset is the same as the compiler's. More on that below.

The proof means that everything we want to know about the kernel's behaviour (other than timing) is expressed by the abstract spec, and the kernel cannot behave in ways that are not allowed by the spec. Among others, this rules out the usual attacks against operating systems, such as stack smashing, null-pointer dereference, any code injection or control-flow hijacking etc.

### Translation validation

Having a bug-free C implementation of the kernel is great, but still leaves us at the mercy of the C compiler. Those compilers (we use GCC) are themselves large, complex programs that have bugs. So we could have a bug-free kernel that gets compiled into a buggy binary.

In the security-critical space, compiler bugs are not the only problem. A compiler could be outright malicious, containing a Trojan that automatically builds in a back door when compiling the OS. The Trojan can be extended to automatically add itself when compiling the compiler, making it almost impossible to detect, even if the compiler is open-source! Ken Thompson explained this attack in his Turing Award lecture [Thompson, 1984].

To protect against defective or malicious compilers, we additionally verify the executable binary that is produced by the compiler and linker. Specifically, we prove that the binary




Figure 3.2: Translation validation proof chain.

is a correct translation of the (proved correct) C code, and thus that the binary refines the abstract spec.

🌶️ Unlike the verification of the C code, this proof is not done manually but by an automatic tool chain. It consists of several phases, as shown in Figure 3.2. A formal model of the processor’s instruction set architecture (ISA) formalises the binary in the theorem prover; we use an L3 formalisation of the RISC-V ISA, as well as the extensively tested L3 Arm ISA formalisation of Fox and Myreen [2010].

Then a disassembler, written in the HOL4 theorem prover, translates this low-level representation into a higher-level representation in a graph language that basically represents control flow. This transformation is provably correct.

The formalised C program is translated into the same graph language, through provably correct transformations in the Isabelle/HOL theorem prover. We then have two programs, in the same representation, which we need to show equivalent. This is a bit tricky, as compilers apply a number of heuristic-driven transformations to optimise the code. We apply a number of such transformations through rewrite rules on the graph-language representation of the C program (still in the theorem prover, and thus provably correct).

In the end we then have two programs that are quite similar but not the same, and we need to prove that they have the same semantics. In theory this is equivalent to the halting problem and as such unsolvable. In practice, what the compiler does is deterministic enough to make the problem tractable. We do this by throwing the programs, in small chunks, at multiple SMT solvers. If one of these can prove that all the corresponding pieces have the same semantics, then we know that the two programs are equivalent.

Note also that the C program that is proved to refine the abstract spec, and the C program that we prove to be equivalent to the binary, are the same Isabelle/HOL formalisations. This means that our assumptions on C semantics drop out of the assumptions made by the proofs. Altogether, the proofs not only show that the compiler did not introduce bugs, but also that its semantics for the C subset we

use are the same as ours.

## Security properties


Figure 3.1 also shows proofs between the abstract spec and the high-level security properties *confidentiality*, *integrity* and *availability* (these are commonly dubbed the *CIA properties*). These state that the abstract spec is actually useful for security: They prove that in a correctly configured system, the kernel will enforce these properties.

Specifically, seL4 enforces

**confidentiality:** seL4 will not allow an entity to read (or otherwise infer) data without having been explicitly given read access to the data;

**integrity:** seL4 will not allow an entity to modify data without having been explicitly given write access to the data;

**availability:** seL4 will not allow an entity to prevent another entity's authorised use of resources.

 These proofs presently do not capture properties associated with time. Our confidentiality proofs rule out *covert storage channels* but presently not *covert timing channels*, which are used by such attacks as Spectre. Preventing timing channels is something we are working on [Heiser et al., 2019]. Similarly, the integrity and availability proofs presently do not cover timeliness, but our new MCS model [Lyons et al., 2018] is designed to cover those aspects (see Section 5.2).

## Proof assumptions

All reasoning about correctness is based on assumptions, whether the reasoning is formal, as with seL4, or informal, when someone thinks about why their program might be "correct". Every program executes in some context, and its correct behaviour inevitably depends on some assumptions about this context.

One of the advantages of machine-checked formal reasoning is that it forces people to make those assumptions explicit. It is not possible to make unstated assumptions, the proofs will just not succeed if they depend on assumptions that are not clearly stated. In that sense, formal reasoning protects against forgetting assumptions, or not being clear about them; that in itself is a significant benefit of verification.

The verification of seL4 makes three assumptions:

**Hardware behaves as expected.** This should be obvious. The kernel is at the mercy of the underlying hardware, and if the hardware is buggy (or worse, has Trojans), then all bets are off, whether you are running verified seL4 or any unverified OS. Verifying hardware is outside the scope of seL4 (and the competency of TS); other people are working on that.

**The spec matches expectations.** This is a difficult one, because one can never be sure that a formal specification means what we think it should mean. Of course, the same problem exists if there is *no* formal specification: if the spec is informal

or non-existent, then it is obviously impossible to precisely reason about correct behaviour.

One can reduce this risk by proving properties about the spec, as we have done with our security proofs, which show that seL4 is able to enforce certain security properties. That then shifts the problem to the specification of those properties. They are much simpler than the kernel spec, reducing the risk of misunderstanding.

But in the end, there is always a gap between the world of mathematics and the physical world, and no end of reasoning (formal or informal) can remove this completely. The advantage of formal reasoning is that you know exactly what this gap is.

**The theorem prover is correct.** This sounds like a serious problem, given that theorem provers are themselves large and complex programs. However, in reality this is the least concerning of the three assumptions. The reason is that the Isabelle/HOL theorem prover has a small core (of a few 10 kSLOC) that checks all proofs against the axioms of the logic. And this core has checked many proofs small and large from a wide field of formal reasoning, so the chance of it containing a correctness-critical bug is extremely small.

## Proof status and coverage

seL4 has been or is being verified for multiple architectures: Arm, x86 and RISC-V. Some of these are more complete than others, but the missing bits are generally worked on or waiting for funding. Please refer to the [seL4 project status page](#) for details.

## 3.2 The CAMkES component framework

CAMkES is a component framework that allows you to reason about a system architecturally, i.e. as a collection of sandboxed components with defined communication channels. [Figure 3.3](#) shows the main abstractions.

**Components** are represented as square boxes. They represent programs, code and data, encapsulated by seL4.




Figure 3.3: CAMkES components and connectors.

**Interfaces** are shown as decorations on the components. They define how a component can be invoked, or can invoke others. An interface is either imported (invoking an interface of another component) or exported (able to be invoked by another component's imported interface), except for the shared-memory interface, which is symmetric.

**Connectors** connect like interfaces by linking an importing with an exporting interface. Connectors in CAMkES are always one-to-one, but broadcast or multicast functionality can be implemented on top of this model by building components that copy inputs to multiple outputs.

The CAMkES system is specified in a formal *architecture description language* (the CAMkES ADL), which contains a precise description of the components, their interfaces and the connectors that link them up. The CAMkES promise to the system designer is that what is specified in the ADL (and visualised as in Figure 3.3) is a faithful representation of the possible interactions. In particular, it promises that no interactions are possible beyond those shown in the diagram.




Figure 3.4: Verified architecture mapping and system generation (note that not all verification steps are of full strength yet). Green boxes are generated provably correct.

Of course, this promise depends on enforcement by seL4, and the ADL representation must be mapped onto low-level seL4 objects and access rights to them. This is what the CAMkES machinery achieves, and is shown in Figure 3.4.

In the figure, the architecture (i.e. what is described in the ADL) is shown at the top. This

is a fairly simple system, consisting of four native components and one component that houses a virtual machine hosting a Linux guest with a couple of networking drivers. The Linux VM is only connected to other components via the crypto component, which ensures that it can only access encrypted links and cannot leak data.

Even this simple system maps to hundreds if not thousands of seL4 objects, an indication of the complexity reduction provided by the CAMkES component abstraction.


For the seL4-level description we have another formal language, called CapDL (capability distribution language). The system designer never needs to deal with CapDL, it is a purely internal representation. The CAMkES framework contains a compiler which automatically translates CAMkES ADL into CapDL, indicated by the box arrow pointing left-down. The box in the left of the figure gives a (simplified) representation of the seL4 objects described in CapDL. (It is actually a simplified representation of a much simpler system, basically just the two components at the top of [Figure 3.3](#) and the connector between them.)

The CapDL spec is a precise representation of access rights in the system, and it is what seL4 enforces. Which means that once the system gets into the state described by the CapDL spec, it is guaranteed to behave as described by the CAMkES ADL spec, and therefore the architecture-level description is sufficient for further reasoning about security properties.

So we need assurance that the system boots up into the state described by the CapDL spec. We achieve this with a second automated step: We generate from CapDL the startup code that, as soon as seL4 itself has booted, takes control and generates all the seL4 objects referenced by the spec, including the ones describing active components, and distributes the *capabilities* (see [Chapter 4](#)) that grant access to those objects according to the spec. At the end of the execution of this init code, the system is provably in the state described by the CapDL spec, and thus in the state represented by the ADL spec.

The third thing that gets generated from the ADL spec is the “glue” code between components. Sending data through a connector requires invocation of seL4 system calls, the exact details of which are hidden by the CAMkES abstraction. The glue code is setting up these system calls. For example, an “RPC” connector abstracts the invocation of a function provided by another component as a regular function call performed by the client component.

**Note:** At the time of writing, the proofs about CAMkES and CapDL are not yet complete, but completion should not be far off.

 Note also that none of the verification work mentioned deals with information leakage through timing channels (yet). This is a major unsolved research problem, but we’re at the forefront of solving it.



# Chapter 4

## About Capabilities

We encountered capabilities in [Chapter 1](#), noting that they are access tokens. We will now look at the concept in more detail.

### 4.1 What are capabilities?





Figure 4.1: A capability is key that conveys specific rights to a particular object.

As shown in [Figure 4.1](#), a capability is an object reference; in that sense it is similar to a pointer (and implementation of capabilities are often referred as “fat pointers”). They are immutable pointers, in the sense that a capability will always reference the *same* object, so each capability uniquely specifies a particular object.


In addition to pointers, a capability also encodes access rights, in fact, the capability is an encapsulation of an object reference and the rights it conveys to that object. In a capability-based system, such as seL4, invoking a capability is the one and only way of performing an operation on a system object.


For example, an operation may be to call a function in a component. The object reference embedded in the capability then points to an interface to that object, and conveys the right to invoke that function (i.e. a particular method on the component object). The capability may or may not at the same time convey the right to pass another capability along as a function argument (delegating to the component the right to use the object referenced by the capability argument).

 This is a high-level description of what happens at the CAMkES abstraction level. In fact, at the CAMkES level, the capabilities themselves are abstracted away.

Underneath, the connector is represented by an *endpoint* object, and the client component needs a capability with `call` right.

It is this fine-grained, object-oriented nature that makes capabilities the access-control mechanism of choice for security-oriented systems. The rights given to a component can be restricted to the absolute minimum it needs to do its job, as required by the [principle of least privilege](#).

 Note that this notion of *object capabilities* is quite different from (and far more powerful than) what Linux calls “capabilities”, which are really access-control lists (ACLs) with system-call granularity. Linux capabilities, like all ACL schemes, suffer from the [confused deputy problem](#), which is at the root of many security breaches, and explained in the next section. seL4 capabilities do not have this problem.

 seL4 capabilities are also not susceptible to the attack of [Boebert \[1984\]](#); this attack applies to capabilities directly implemented in hardware while seL4’s capabilities are implemented and protected by the kernel.

 There are ten types of seL4 objects, all referenced by capabilities:

**Endpoints** are used to perform protected function calls;

**Reply Objects** represent a return path from a protected procedure call;

**Address Spaces** provide the sandboxes around components (thin wrappers abstracting hardware page tables);

**Cnodes** store capabilities representing a component’s access rights;

**Thread Control Blocks** represent threads of execution;

**Scheduling Contexts** represent the right to access a certain fraction of execution time on a core;

**Notifications** are synchronisation objects (similar to semaphores);

**Frames** represent physical memory that can be mapped into address spaces;

**Interrupt objects** provide access to interrupt handling; and

**Untyped** unused (free) physical memory that can be converted (“retyped”) into any of the other types.

## 4.2 Why Capabilities

### Fine-grained access control

As observed above, capabilities provide fine-grained access control, in line with the security principle of least privilege (also called *principle of least authority*, short POLA). This is in contrast to the more traditional access-control model of access-control lists (ACLs), which are used in mainstream systems such as Linux or Windows, but also in commercial, supposedly secure systems, such as INTEGRITY or PikeOS.

To understand the difference, consider how access control works in Linux: A file (and the file model applies to most other Linux objects) has an associated set of access-mode bits. Some of these bits determine what operations its owner can perform on the file, others represent the operations permitted for each member of the file’s “group”,

and a final set gives default rights to everyone else. This is a subject-oriented scheme: It is a property of the subject (the process that is attempting access) that determines the validity of the access, and all subjects with the same value of the property (user ID or group ID) have the same rights. Moreover, these subjects have the same rights to *all* files with the same settings of the access properties.

This is a very coarse-grain form of access control, and is a fundamental limitation on what security policies can be enforced. A typical scenario is that a user wants to run an untrusted program (downloaded from the internet) to process a particular file but wants to prevent the program from accessing any other files the user has access. This is called a *confinement* scenario, and there is no clean way to do this in Linux, which is the reason people came up with heavyweight workarounds (I like to call them hacks) such as “chroot jails”, containers etc.

With capabilities, this problem is straightforward to solve, as capabilities provide an object-oriented form of access control. Specifically, the kernel will allow an operation to go ahead if and only if the subject that requests the operation presents a capability that empowers it to perform the operation. In the confinement scenario, the untrusted app can only access files to which it has been given a capability. So Alice invokes the program, handing it a capability to the one file the program is allowed to read, plus a capability to a file where the program can write its output, and the program is unable to access anything else – proper least privilege.

## Interposition and delegation

Capabilities have further nice properties. One is the ability to interpose access, which is a consequence of the fact that they are opaque object references. If Alice is given a capability to an object, she has no way of knowing what that object really is, all she can do is invoke methods on the object.

For example, the system designer may pretend that the capability given to Alice refers to a file, when in fact it refers to a communication channel to a security monitor, which in turns holds the actual file capability. The monitor can examine Alice’s requested operations and, if valid, performs them on the file on her behalf, while ignoring invalid ones. The monitor effectively virtualises the file.



Interposition has applications beyond enforcing security policies; the approach can be used for packet filtering, information-flow tracing and many more. A debugger can transparently interpose and virtualise object invocations. It can even be used to create objects lazily: Instead of an object reference, Alice is given a capability to a constructor, which then replaces the capability once the object has been created.

Another advantage of capabilities is that they support safe and efficient delegation of privilege. If Alice wants to give Bob access to one of her objects, she can create (“mint” in seL4 speak) a new capability to the object and hand it to Bob. Bob then can use that capability to operate on the object without referring back to Alice. (If, instead, Alice does want to stay in the loop, it can use virtualisation as explained above.)

The new capability can have diminished rights; Alice can use this to give Bob only read-only access to the file. And Alice can revoke Bob’s access at any time by destroying the

derived capability she handed to Bob.

Delegation is powerful and cannot easily and safely be done in ACL systems. A typical case of its use is setting up sub-systems that manage resources autonomously. When the system starts up, the initial process holds authority to all resources in the system (other than the small and fixed amount the kernel uses itself). This initial resource manager can then partition the system, by creating new processes (secondary resource managers) and handing them privilege to disjoint subsets of the system resources.

The subsystems can then autonomously (without referring back to the original manager) control their subset of resources, while unable to interfere with each other. Only if they want to change the original resource allocation do they need to involve the original manager.

### Ambient authority and the confused deputy




Figure 4.2: The compiler as a confused deputy.

ACLs have an unsolvable problem, generally called the *confused deputy*. Let's look at a C compiler. It takes a C source file and produces an object-code output file, the file names are passed as arguments. To run the compiler, a user, Alice, must have execute permission on the compiler, as shown in [Figure 4.2](#).

Assume the compiler also creates an entry in a system-wide log file for auditing purposes. The log file is not accessible to normal users, so the compiler must execute with elevated privilege in order to write to the log file (traditionally done by making it a *setuid* program).

If Alice is malicious, she can trick the compiler into doing things it shouldn't do. For example, Alice can specify the password file as the output file when invoking the compiler. The compiler, unless it is written very carefully to avoid any potential abuse, will just open the output file (password file) and overwrite it with the compiled object code. It doesn't take a lot of skill for Alice to write a program which compiles such that the newly generated password file will give her privileges she should not have.

The fundamental problem here is that ACL-based systems use *ambient authority* for determining access rights. When the compiler opens its output file for writing, the OS determines the validity of the access by looking at the compiler's subject ID, to determine whether it has access to the object. It is up to the compiler to determine whether the operation is valid or not, making the compiler part of the system's TCB, meaning it has to be fully trusted to do the right thing under all circumstances.

ACL-based systems can employ a number of workarounds to mitigate the particular problem here, for example, ensuring that the password file and the log file are in different security domains (which will not stop Alice from clobbering the log file, which in itself

is a useful thing to do for an attacker covering her traces). This then sets up the usual arms race of attacks and workarounds, which is always a losing proposition for the good guys.

The confusion arises due to ambient authority: The validity of an operation is determined by the security state of the agent (compiler), which in this case is a deputy operating on behalf of an original agent (Alice). For proper security, the access must be determined by Alice's security state. This means that denomination (the reference to the file) and authority (the right to perform operations on the file) must be coupled, a principle called *no designation without authority*. If that is the case, then the compiler invokes the designated object (output file) with the authority that comes with the designation (from Alice), and Alice can no longer confuse the deputy.

This is exactly what a capability system enforces. In such a system, Alice needs to hold three capabilities: an execute capability on the compiler, a read capability on the input file, and a write capability on the output file. She invokes the compiler with the execute capability and passes the other two as arguments. When the compiler then opens the output file, it does so with the capability provided by Alice, and there is no more confusion possible. The compiler uses a separate capability, which it holds itself, for opening the log file, keeping the two files well separated. In particular, it is impossible for Alice to trick the compiler into writing to a file she has no access to herself.

The confused deputy problem is the "killer app" for capabilities, as the problem is unsolvable with ACLs. Hence, next time someone is trying to sell you a "secure" OS, not only ask whether they have a correctness proof for the OS, but also whether it uses capability-based access control. If the answer to either questions is "no", then you're being offered snake oil.

# Chapter 5


## Support for Hard Real-Time Systems

seL4 is designed as a protected-mode real-time OS. This means that unlike classical RTOSes, seL4 combines real-time capability with memory protection, for security as well as part of its support for mixed-criticality systems.


### 5.1 General real-time support

seL4 has a simple, priority-based scheduling policy that is easy to understand and analyse, a core requirement for hard real-time systems. The kernel will, on its own, never adjust priorities, so the user is in control.

Another requirement are bounded interrupt latencies. seL4, like most members of the L4 microkernel family, executes with interrupts disabled while in kernel mode. This design decision greatly simplifies the kernel design and implementation, as the kernel (on a uniprocessor) requires no concurrency control. seL4's formal verification would otherwise be infeasible, but the design is also an enabler for excellent average-case performance.

 There is a widespread belief that a real-time OS must be preemptible, except for short critical sections, in order to keep interrupt latencies low. While true for traditional unprotected RTOSes running on simple microcontrollers, this belief is mistaken for a protected-mode system, such as seL4. The reason is that when running on a powerful microprocessor with memory protection enabled, the time for entering the kernel, switching context, and exiting the kernel, is significant, and not much less than a seL4 system call. In terms of interrupt latencies, little could be gained by a preemptible design, but the cost in terms of complexity would be very high, making a preemptible design unjustified.

This works as long as all system calls are short. In seL4 they generally are, but there are exceptions. Especially revoking a capability can be a long-running operation. seL4 deals with this situation by breaking such operations into short sub-operations, and making it possible to abort and restart the complete operation after each sub-operation, should there be a pending interrupt.

 The approach is called incremental consistency. Each sub-operation transforms the kernel from a consistent state into another consistent state. The operation is

structured such that after aborting, the operation can be restarted without repeating the sub-operations that had succeeded before the abort. The kernel checks for pending interrupts after each sub-operation. If there are any, it aborts the current operation, at which time the interrupt forces re-entry into the kernel, which processes the interrupt. When finished, the original system call is restarted, which then continues from the point where it was aborted, guaranteeing progress.

We performed a complete and sound worst-case execution time (WCET) analysis of seL4, which is the only one documented for a protected-mode OS [Blackham et al., 2011, Sewell et al., 2016]. It means that we had obtained provable, hard upper bounds for all system-call latencies and, by implication, worst-case interrupt latencies.

This WCET analysis is a prerequisite for supporting hard real-time systems, and also a feature that puts seL4 apart from the competition. While complete and sound WCET analyses had been done for unprotected RTOSes, the industry-standard approach for protected-mode systems is to subject the kernel to high load, measure the latencies, take the worst observed one and add a safety factor. There can be no guarantee that the bound obtained by this approach is safe, and it is unsuitable for safety-critical systems.

We did the WCET analysis of seL4 for Arm v6 processors. It has since fallen into abeyance, as Arm has stopped providing the required information on the worst-case latencies of instructions, and Intel never provided those for their architecture. However, with the advent of open-source RISC-V processors, we will be able to redo this analysis.

## 5.2 Mixed-criticality systems

### What is a mixed-criticality system?

Criticality is a term from the safety domain relating to the seriousness of a failure of a component. For example, avionics standards categorise failures from “no effect” (on vehicle safety) to “catastrophic” (loss of life). The more critical a component, the more extensive (and expensive) is the required assurance, so there is a strong incentive for keeping criticalities low.

A mixed-criticality system (MCS) is made up of (interacting) components of different criticalities. Its core safety requirement is that failure of a component must not affect any more critical components, so the critical components can be assured independent of the less critical ones.

The trend to MCS results from the desire to consolidate: Traditionally, critical systems would use a dedicated microcontroller for each function, i.e. isolation by air-gapping. With growing functionality, this approach leads to a proliferation of processors (and their packaging and wiring), which causes *space, weight and power* (SWaP) problems, which MCS aim to overcome.

This is similar to the security notion of having trusted and untrusted components in the same system, and the core requirement on the OS is in both cases strong isolation. The challenge in the safety domain is that safety depends not only on functional correctness but also on timeliness: Critical components typically have real-time requirements, meaning that they have to respond to an event by a deadline.

## Traditional approach to MCS

Traditional MCS OSes completely isolate components temporally and spatially, an approach called *strict time and space partitioning* (TSP), exemplified by the [ARINC 653](#) avionics standard [[ARINC](#)]. This means that each component is statically assigned a fixed memory area, and partitions are executing according to a pre-determined schedule, with fixed time slices.

The TSP approach guarantees isolation, but has severe drawbacks. The most obvious one is poor resource utilisation. Every real-time component must be able to finish its work within its time slice, so the time slice must be at least the component's worst-case execution time. The WCET of a component can be orders of magnitude larger than the typical execution time, as it must allow for exceptional circumstances.

Furthermore, determining a safe bound for the WCET is generally tricky. For critical components it must be done very conservatively to convince a sceptical certification authority, which typically leads to large over-estimates. This means that typically the processor is greatly under-utilised. But, because of the strict partitioning, the slack time cannot be used by other components, so the poor utilisation is an inherent problem. Basically, by retaining the strong isolation of air-gapping, TSP also retains its poor resource usage.

Another big drawback of TSP is that interrupt latencies are inherently high. Take the example of [Figure 5.1](#), which might represent a (highly simplified) autonomous vehicle. The critical component is a control loop, which executes once every 5 ms to process sensor data and send commands to actuators. Its WCET, and therefore time slice, is 3 ms. The vehicle also communicates with a ground station, which can update way points. Because the system operates on a 5 ms period, this is the latency at which network interrupts can be processed, greatly limiting network throughput and generally responsiveness to external events.

## MCS support in seL4

The core challenge with MCS is that the OS must provide strong resource isolation, but TSP is overly simplistic (and thus inflexible). In terms of space resources, seL4 already has a flexible, powerful and provably secure model: object capabilities (see [Chapter 4](#)). MCS support extends this to time: access to the processor is now also controlled by





Figure 5.1: Simplified example of a mixed-criticality system.




capabilities.

seL4's capabilities for processor time are called *scheduling-context capabilities*. A component can only obtain processor time if it holds such a capability, and the amount of processor time it can use is encoded in the capability. This is analogous to the way access rights to spatial objects work.

 In traditional seL4 (as in most L4 kernels before it) a thread had two main scheduling parameters: a *priority* and a *time slice*, which determine access to the processor. The priority determines when a thread can execute: it can run if there is no higher-priority thread runnable. The time slice determines how long the kernel will let the thread run before preempting it (unless it is preempted before by a higher priority thread becoming runnable). When the time slice is exhausted, the scheduler will again pick the highest-priority runnable thread (which may be the thread just preempted), with a round-robin policy used within priority levels.

The MCS version of seL4 replaces the time slice by a capability to a scheduling-context object, which performs a similar function, but in a more precise way that is the key to isolation: A scheduling context contains two main attributes. (1) a *time budget*, which is similar to the old time slice, and limits the time for which a thread can execute until preempted. (2) a *time period*, which determines how often the budget can be used: the thread will not get more time than one budget per period, preventing it from monopolising the CPU irrespective of its priority.

Scheduling contexts support reasoning about the amount of time a thread can consume, and therefore, how much time is left. Specifically, they can be used to prevent a high-priority thread from monopolising the processor.

 Applied to the above example, this means that we can give the (less critical) device driver a higher priority than the (critical) control component. This allows the driver to preempt the control, leading to high responsiveness. But the budget limit will stop the driver from monopolising the CPU.

For example, we give the controller a budget of 3 ms (its WCET) and a period of 5 ms (corresponding to the frequency at which it operates). And we give the high-priority driver a small budget of 3  $\mu$ s with a period of 10  $\mu$ s, meaning it can under no circumstances consume more than 30% of total processor time, yet can execute frequently enough to ensure good responsiveness. Importantly we can guarantee that the control, which needs no more than 60% of available processor time, is left with enough time to meet its deadline.

By guaranteeing the critical deadline irrespective of the behaviour of the driver, we isolate the control from the untrusted driver, according to the core requirement of MCS. In particular, the driver need not be certified as safety-critical.

seL4's time capability model addresses a number of other challenges of MCS, which go beyond the scope of this white paper, and we refer the interested reader to the peer-reviewed publication [Lyons et al., 2018]. Suffice to say that seL4 provides the most advanced and flexible MCS support of any OS suitable for critical systems.

# Chapter 6


## Security is No Excuse for Poor Performance

Performance has always been the hallmark of L4 microkernels, and seL4 is no exception. We built seL4 for real-world use, and our aim was not to lose more than 10% in IPC performance relative to the fastest kernels we had before. As it turns out, seL4 ended up beating the performance of those kernels.

And it beats the performance of any other microkernel. This is a claim that is difficult to prove, as the competition generally holds their performance data close to their chest (for very good reason!)

However, we make this performance claim, publicly, at every opportunity. If anyone disagrees they need to present evidence. We also know through a number of informal channels that IPC performance of other systems tends to range between 2 times slower than seL4 to *much* slower, typically around a factor of ten.

The few independent performance comparisons certainly back our claim.

 [Mi et al. \[2019\]](#) compare the performance of three open-source systems, seL4, Fiasco.OC and Zircon. It finds that seL4 IPC costs are about 10–20% above the hardware limit of kernel entry, address-space switch and kernel exit. Fiasco.OC is more than a factor of two slower than seL4 (close to three times the hardware limit), and Zircon is almost nine times slower than seL4.

[Gu et al. \[2016\]](#) compare the performance of CertiKOS to seL4, measuring 3,820 cycles for a round-trip IPC operation in CertiKOS compared to 1,830 in seL4, a factor of two. However, it turns out `seL4bench`, the seL4 benchmarking suite, had at the time a bug in dealing with timers on x86, resulting in exaggerated latencies. The correct [seL4 performance figure](#) is around 720 cycles, or more than five times faster than CertiKOS. This is in the context of CertiKOS offering very limited functionality, and no capability-based security.

# Chapter 7

## Real-World Deployment and Incremental Cyber Retrofit

### 7.1 General considerations

When planning to [protect the security or safety of your system with seL4](#), the first step should be to identify the critical assets you need to protect. The aim should be to minimise this part of your trusted computing base, and make it as modular as feasible, with each module becoming an seL4-protected CAMkES component.

The other important preparation is to check [availability](#) and [verification status](#) of seL4 on your platform. Obviously you will want a verified kernel, that's what seL4 is all about. However, even on platforms where the kernel is not verified, the fact that it shares much of its code with a verified platform will give you much higher assurance than with almost any other OS. But keep in mind that without verification the assurance is not what it can be. Also, you [must not make any verification claim](#) if you are using a kernel that is not verified for your platform, or that is in any way modified.

You furthermore will need to assess whether the [available user-level infrastructure](#) is sufficient for your purpose. If not, then this is where the community may help you. There are companies specialising in providing support for seL4 adoption. Also, if you develop any generally useful components yourself, you should seriously consider sharing them with the community under an appropriate open-source license. Those who give back will find it easier to get help from others.

### 7.2 Retrofitting existing systems

Most real-world deployments of seL4 will not run everything native. Typically, there are significant legacy components that would be expensive to port, because they are too big or rely on too many system services that are not presently supported by seL4. Also, frequently there would be little security or safety gain from running such legacy stacks natively.

Using seL4's virtualisation capabilities is frequently the pragmatic way to proceed, [Section 2.3](#) shows examples.




Figure 7.1: Incremental cyber-retrofit of the Boeing ULB mission computer during the DARPA HACMS program.

The typical approach is what we call *incremental cyber-retrofit*, a term coined by then DARPA program director John Launchbury. As Figure 7.1 shows, this typically starts out by simply putting the whole existing software stack into a virtual machine running on seL4. Obviously this step buys nothing in terms of security and safety, it only adds (very small) overhead. Its significance is that it provides a baseline from where to start modularising.

A great example is the work our HACMS project partners did on cyber-retrofitting the Boeing ULB autonomous helicopter. The original system ran on Linux, and in a first step, the team put seL4 underneath.

The next step broke out two components: The particularly untrusted camera software was moved to a second VM, also running Linux, with the two Linux VMs communicating via CAMkES channels. At the same time, the network stack was pulled out of the VM and converted to a native CAMkES component, also communicating with the main VM.

The final step pulled all other critical modules, as well as the (untrusted) GPS software, into separate CAMkES components, removing the original main VM. The final system consisted of a number of CAMkES components running seL4-native code, and a single VM running just Linux and the camera software.

The upshot was that while the initial system was readily hacked by the professional penetration testers hired by DARPA, the end state was highly resilient. The attackers could compromise the Linux system and do whatever they wanted with it, but were unable to break out and compromise any of the rest of the system. The team was confident enough to demonstrate an attack in-flight.

# Chapter 8

## Conclusions

seL4 was the world's first OS kernel with a proof of implementation correctness (functional correctness). We then extended the verification down to the binary and up to security-enforcement properties, as explained in [Chapter 3](#).

While by now there are other verified OS kernels, seL4 still defines the state of the art [[Heiser, 2019](#)]: It has the most comprehensive verification story, it is still the only capability-based OS that is verified, and it has the most advanced real-time support. And our ongoing research aims to ensure that seL4 will retain its position as the clear leader among security- and safety-oriented OSES, for example by pioneering systematic and principled prevention of information leakage through timing channels [[Ge et al., 2019](#)].

Besides this technological leadership, seL4 is in practical terms still far ahead of its successors: While we designed seL4 for real-world use from the beginning, almost all other verified OS kernels are academic toys, and far from real-world capable. In fact, we are only aware of one other (very recently) verified system that is practically deployable (although in far more limited scenarios).

seL4's real-world readiness is a result of two aspects that drove the design: uncompromising performance focus, as highlighted in [Chapter 6](#), and mechanisms that are designed to support the widest range of application scenarios and security policies, the latter enabled by capability-based access control ([Chapter 4](#)).

Ten years of taking seL4 to the real-world, including cyber-retrofitting legacy systems ([Chapter 7](#)), has obviously helped us to refine and improve the system, but I'm proud to say that mild, incremental changes were sufficient. The one exception is the MCS support ([Section 5.2](#)), which required a fairly significant change to the model and its implementation, but privileged management of time was the one thing we knowingly left in the to-do basket at the time of the original design [[Heiser and Elphinstone, 2016](#)].

This white paper has hopefully given you a reasonable idea of what seL4 is, what you can do with it, and, importantly, why you would want to use it. I hope this will help you become an active member of the seL4 community, including joining and participating in the [seL4 Foundation](#).

I expect this document will keep evolving, and I am keen on feedback. But most of all, I'm keen to hear of your experience with deploying seL4.

# Acknowledgments

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