NICTA Trustworthy Systems http://ssrg.nicta.com.au/projects/TS/

# seL4 Reference Manual Version 3.0.1

Trustworthy Systems Team, NICTA ssrg@nicta.com.au

6 April 2016

O 2016 General Dynamics C4 Systems.

All rights reserved.

#### Acknowledgements

The primary authors of this document are Matthew Grosvenor and Adam Walker, with contributions from Adrian Danis, Andrew Boyton, David Greenaway, Etienne Le Sueur, Gernot Heiser, Gerwin Klein, Godfrey van der Linden, Kevin Elphinstone, Matthew Fernandez, Matthias Daum, Michael von Tessin, Peter Chubb, Simon Winwood, Thomas Sewell, Timothy Bourke and Toby Murray. All authors and contributors can be contacted at firstname.lastname@nicta.com.au.

# Contents

1	Intr	oducti	on	1
<b>2</b>	Ker	nel Se	rvices and Objects	<b>2</b>
	2.1	Capab	ility-based Access Control	2
	2.2	System	n Calls	3
	2.3	Kerne	l Objects	5
	2.4	Kerne	l Memory Allocation	6
		2.4.1	Reusing Memory	7
3	Cap	ability	7 Spaces	8
	3.1	Capab	ility and CSpace Management	9
		3.1.1	CSpace Creation	9
		3.1.2	CNode Methods	9
		3.1.3	Capability Rights	10
		3.1.4	Capability Derivation Tree	10
	3.2	Deletie	on, Revocation, and Recycling	11
	3.3	CSpac	e Addressing	13
		3.3.1	Capability Address Lookup	13
		3.3.2	Addressing Capabilities	14
	3.4	Looku	p Failure Description	16
		3.4.1	Invalid Root	16
		3.4.2	Missing Capability	16
		3.4.3	Depth Mismatch	16
		3.4.4	Guard Mismatch	17
4	Mes	ssage F	Passing (IPC)	18
	4.1	Messa	ge Registers	18

	4.2	Endpoints	20
		4.2.1 Endpoint Badges	20
		4.2.2 Capability Transfer	20
		4.2.3 Errors	21
5	Not	ifications	22
	5.1	Notification Objects	22
	5.2	Signalling, Polling and Waiting	22
	5.3	Binding Notifications	23
6	$\mathbf{Thr}$	eads and Execution	<b>24</b>
	6.1	Threads	24
		6.1.1 Thread Creation	24
		6.1.2 Thread Deactivation	24
		6.1.3 Scheduling	25
		6.1.4 Exceptions	25
		6.1.5 Message Layout of the Read-/Write-Registers Methods	25
	6.2	Faults	26
		6.2.1 Capability Faults	26
		6.2.2 Unknown Syscall	27
		6.2.3 User Exception	28
		6.2.4 VM Fault	28
	6.3	Domains	29
7	Ado	lress Spaces and Virtual Memory	30
	7.1	Overview	30
	7.2	Objects	31
	7.3	Mapping Attributes	32
	7.4	Sharing Memory	33
	7.5	Page Faults	33
8	Har	dware I/O	34
	8.1	Interrupt Delivery	34
	8.2	IA-32-Specific I/O	35
		8.2.1 I/O Ports	35

		8.2.2 I/O Space	35
9	Syst	em Bootstrapping	37
	9.1	Initial Thread's Environment	37
	9.2	BootInfo Frame	38
	9.3	Boot Command-line Arguments	39
	9.4	Multikernel Bootstrapping	40
10	seL4	4 API Reference	42
		Error Codes	42
		10.1.1 Invalid Argument	
		10.1.2 Invalid Capability	
		10.1.3 Illegal Operation	
		10.1.4 Range Error	
		10.1.5 Alignment Error	
		10.1.6 Failed Lookup	
		10.1.7 Delete First	
		10.1.8 Revoke First	43
		10.1.9 Not Enough Memory	
	10.2	System Calls	
		10.2.1 Send	44
		10.2.2 Recv	44
		10.2.3 Call	45
		10.2.4 Reply	45
		10.2.5 Polling Send	45
		10.2.6 Reply Recv	
		10.2.7 NBRecv	46
		10.2.8 Yield	47
		10.2.9 Signal	47
		10.2.10 Wait	48
		10.2.11 Poll	48
	10.3	Architecture-Independent Object Methods	49
		10.3.1 CNode - Copy	
		10.3.2 CNode - Delete	50

	10.3.3 CNode - Mint	51
	10.3.4 CNode - Move	52
	10.3.5 CNode - Mutate	53
	10.3.6 CNode - Recycle	54
	10.3.7 CNode - Revoke	55
	10.3.8 CNode - Rotate	56
	10.3.9 CNode - Save Caller	57
	10.3.10 Debug - Halt	57
	10.3.11 Debug - Put Character $\ldots$	58
	$10.3.12$ DomainSet - Set $\ldots$	58
	10.3.13 IRQ Control - Get $\ldots$	59
	10.3.14 IRQ Handler - Acknowledge	59
	$10.3.15\mathrm{IRQ}$ Handler - Clear $\hdots$	60
	10.3.16 IRQ Handler - Set Notification $\ldots \ldots \ldots \ldots \ldots \ldots \ldots \ldots$	60
	10.3.17 TCB - Bind Notification	61
	10.3.18 TCB - Unbind Notification	61
	10.3.19 TCB - Configure	62
	10.3.20 TCB - Copy Registers	63
	10.3.21 TCB - Read Registers $\ldots$	64
	10.3.22 TCB - Resume	64
	10.3.23 TCB - Set IPC Buffer $\ldots$	65
	10.3.24 TCB - Set Priority	65
	$10.3.25\mathrm{TCB}$ - Set Space $\ldots$	66
	10.3.26 TCB - Suspend	66
	10.3.27 TCB - Write Registers	67
	10.3.28 Untyped - Retype	68
	10.3.29 Summary of Object Sizes	69
10.4	IA-32-Specific Object Methods	70
	10.4.1 IA32 ASID Control - Make Pool	70
	10.4.2 IA32 ASID Pool - Assign	70
	10.4.3 IA32 IO Port - In 8	71
	10.4.4 IA32 IO Port - In 16	71
	10.4.5 IA32 IO Port - In 32	71

	10.4.6 IA32 IO Port - Out 8	72
	10.4.7 IA32 IO Port - Out 16	72
	10.4.8 IA32 IO Port - Out 32	73
	10.4.9 IA32 IO Page Table - Map	73
	10.4.10 IA32 Page - Map IO	74
	10.4.11 IA32 Page - Map	74
	10.4.12 IA32 Page - Remap	75
	10.4.13 IA32 Page - Unmap	75
	10.4.14 IA32 Page - Get Address	76
	10.4.15 IA32 Page Table - Map	76
	10.4.16 IA32 Page Table - Unmap	77
10.5	ARM-Specific Object Methods	78
	10.5.1 ARM ASID Control - Make Pool	78
	10.5.2 ARM ASID Pool - Assign	78
	10.5.3 ARM Page - Clean Data	79
	10.5.4 ARM Page - Invalidate Data	79
	10.5.5 ARM Page - Clean and Invalidate Data	80
	10.5.6 ARM Page - Unify Instruction Cache	80
	10.5.7 ARM Page - Map	81
	10.5.8 ARM Page - Remap	81
	10.5.9 ARM Page - Unmap	82
	10.5.10 ARM Page - Get Address $\ldots$	82
	10.5.11 ARM Page Table - Map $\ldots$	83
	10.5.12 ARM Page Table - Unmap $\ldots \ldots \ldots \ldots \ldots \ldots \ldots \ldots \ldots \ldots$	83

# List of Tables

3.1	seL4 access rights.	10
3.2	Capability derivation.	11
4.1	Physical register allocation for IPC messages on the x86 architecture. $% \mathcal{A} = \mathcal{A}$ .	18
4.2	Physical register allocation for IPC messages on the ARM architecture.	19
4.3	Fields of the seL4_IPCBuffer structure. Note that badges and caps use the same area of memory in the structure	19
6.1	Contents of an IPC message.	27
6.2	Unknown system call outcome on the ARM architecture	27
6.3	Unknown system call outcome on the IA-32 architecture. $\ldots$	28
6.4	User exception outcome on the ARM architecture. $\hdots \hdots \$	28
6.5	User exception outcome on the IA-32 architecture	29
7.1	Virtual memory attributes for ARM page table entries	32
7.2	Virtual memory attributes for IA32 page table entries	33
9.1	Initial thread's CNode content.	37
9.2	BootInfo struct.	39
9.3	DeviceRegion struct.	40
9.4	IA-32 boot command-line arguments	40
10.1	Platform-independent object sizes.	69
10.2	IA-32-specific object sizes	69
10.3	ARM-specific object sizes	69

# List of Figures

3.1	Example capability derivation tree	11
3.2	An example CSpace demonstrating object references at all levels, various	14
	guard and radix sizes and internal CNode references	14
3.3	An arbitrary CSpace layout	15

## Introduction

The seL4 microkernel is an operating-system kernel designed to be a secure, safe, and reliable foundation for systems in a wide variety of application domains. As a microkernel, it provides a small number of services to applications, such as abstractions to create and manage virtual address spaces, threads, and inter-process communication (IPC). The small number of services provided by seL4 directly translates to a small implementation of approximately 8700 lines of C code. This has allowed the ARMv6 version of the kernel to be formally proven in the Isabelle/HOL theorem prover to adhere to its formal specification [Boy09, CKS08, DEK<sup>+</sup>06, EKE08, KEH<sup>+</sup>09, TKN07, WKS<sup>+</sup>09], which in turn enabled proofs of the kernel's enforcement of integrity [SWG<sup>+</sup>11] and confidentiality [MMB<sup>+</sup>13]. The kernel's small size was also instrumental in performing a complete and sound analysis of worst-case execution time [BSC<sup>+</sup>11, BSH12].

This manual describes the seL4 kernel's API from a user's point of view. The document starts by giving a brief overview of the seL4 microkernel design, followed by a reference of the high-level API exposed by the seL4 kernel to userspace.

While we have tried to ensure that this manual accurately reflects the behaviour of the seL4 kernel, this document is by no means a formal specification of the kernel. When the precise behaviour of the kernel under a particular circumstance needs to be known, users should refer to the seL4 abstract specification, which gives a formal description of the seL4 kernel.

## Kernel Services and Objects

A limited number of service primitives are provided by the microkernel; more complex services may be implemented as applications on top of these primitives. In this way, the functionality of the system can be extended without increasing the code and complexity in privileged mode, while still supporting a potentially wide number of services for varied application domains.

The basic services seL4 provides are as follows:

Threads are an abstraction of CPU execution that supports running software;

- Address spaces are virtual memory spaces that each contain an application. Applications are limited to accessing memory in their address space;
- **Inter-process communication** (IPC) via *endpoints* allows threads to communicate using message passing;
- Notifications provide a non-blocking signalling mechanism similar to binary semaphores;
- **Device primitives** allow device drivers to be implemented as unprivileged applications. The kernel exports hardware device interrupts via IPC messages; and
- **Capability spaces** store capabilities (i.e., access rights) to kernel services along with their book-keeping information.

This chapter gives an overview of these services, describes how kernel objects are accessed by userspace applications, and describes how new objects can be created.

### 2.1 Capability-based Access Control

The seL4 microkernel provides a capability-based access-control model. Access control governs all kernel services; in order to perform an operation, an application must *invoke* a capability in its possession that has sufficient access rights for the requested service. With this, the system can be configured to isolate software components from each other, and also to enable authorised, controlled communication between components

by selectively granting specific communication capabilities. This enables softwarecomponent isolation with a high degree of assurance, as only those operations explicitly authorised by capability possession are permitted.

A capability is an unforgeable token that references a specific kernel object (such as a thread control block) and carries access rights that control what methods may be invoked. Conceptually, a capability resides in an application's *capability space*; an address in this space refers to a *slot* which may or may not contain a capability. An application may refer to a capability—to request a kernel service, for example—using the address of the slot holding that capability. This means, the seL4 capability model is an instance of a *segregated* (or *partitioned*) capability system, where capabilities are managed by the kernel.

Capability spaces are implemented as a directed graph of kernel-managed *capability nodes* (CNodes). A CNode is a table of slots, where each slot may contain further CNode capabilities. An address in a capability space is then the concatenation of the indices of the CNode capabilities forming the path to the destination slot; we discuss CNode objects in detail in Chapter 3.

Capabilities can be copied and moved within capability spaces, and also sent via IPC. This allows creation of applications with specific access rights, the delegation of authority to another application, and passing to an application authority to a newly created (or selected) kernel service. Furthermore, capabilities can be *minted* to create a derived capability with a subset of the rights of the original capability (never with more rights). A newly minted capability can be used for partial delegation of authority.

Capabilities can also be revoked to withdraw authority. Revocation recursively removes any capabilities that have been derived from the original capability being revoked. The propagation of capabilities through the system is controlled by a *take-grant*-based model [EKE08, Boy09].

### 2.2 System Calls

The seL4 kernel provides a message-passing service for communication between threads. This mechanism is also used for communication with kernel-provided services. There is a standard message format, each message containing a number of data words and possibly some capabilities. The structure and encoding of these messages are described in detail in Chapter 4.

Threads send messages by invoking capabilities within their capability space. When an endpoint capability is invoked in this way, the message will be transferred through the kernel to another thread. When capabilities to kernel objects are invoked, the message will be interpreted as a method invocation in a manner specific to the type of kernel object. For example, invoking a thread control block (TCB) capability with a correctly formatted message will suspend the target thread.

Logically, the kernel provides three system calls, *Send*, *Receive* and *Yield*. However, there are also combinations and variants of the basic *Send* and *Receive* calls, e.g. the *Call* operation, which consists of a send followed by a *Receive* from the same object. Methods on kernel objects other than endpoints and notifications are all mapped to

*Send* or *Call*, depending on whether or not the method returns a result. The *Yield* system call is not associated with any kernel object and is the only operation that does not invoke a capability.

The complete set of system calls is:

- seL4\_Send() delivers a message through the named capability and the application to continue. If the invoked capability is an endpoint, and no receiver is ready to receive the message immediately, the sending thread will block until the message can be delivered. No error code or response will be returned by the receiving object.
- seL4\_NBSend() performs a polling send on an endpoint. It is similar to seL4\_Send(), except that it is guaranteed not to block. If the message cannot be delivered immediately, i.e. there is no receiver waiting on the destination Endpoint, the message is silently dropped. Like seL4\_Send(), no error code or response will be returned.
- seL4\_Call() combines seL4\_Send() and seL4\_Recv(). The call blocks the sending thread until its message is delivered and a reply message is received. When the sent message is delivered to another thread (via an Endpoint), the kernel adds an additional 'reply' capability to the message that is delivered to the receiver, giving the latter the right to reply to the original sender. The reply capability is deposited in a dedicated slot in the receiver's TCB, and is a single-use right, meaning that the kernel invalidates it as soon as it has been invoked.

The seL4\_Call() operation exists not only for efficiency reasons (combining two operations into a single system call). It differs from seL4\_Send() immediately followed by seL4\_Recv() in two ways:

- 1. the single-use reply capability is created to establish a reply channel with minimal trust;
- 2. the transition from send to recv phase is atomic, meaning it cannot be preempted, and the receiver can reply without any risk of blocking.

When invoking capabilities to kernel services, using **seL4\_Call()** allows the kernel to return an error code or other response through the reply message.

- seL4\_Recv() is used by a thread to receive messages through endpoints or notifications. If no sender or notification is pending, the caller will block until a message or notification can be delivered. This system call works only on Endpoint or Notification capabilities, raising a fault (see section 6.2) when attempted with other capability types.
- seL4\_Reply() is used to respond to a seL4\_Call(), using the reply capability generated by the seL4\_Call() system call and stored in the replying thread's TCB. It delivers the message to the thread that invoked the seL4\_Call(), waking it in the process.

There is space for only one reply capability in each thread's TCB, so the seL4\_-Reply() syscall can be used to reply to the most recent caller only. The seL4\_-CNode\_SaveCaller() method that will be described later can be used to save the reply capability into regular capability space, where it can be used with seL4\_Send().

- seL4\_ReplyRecv() combines seL4\_Reply() and seL4\_Recv(). It exists mostly for efficiency reasons: the common case of replying to a request and waiting for the next can be performed in a single kernel system call instead of two. The transition from the reply to the receive phase is also atomic.
- seL4\_NBRecv() is used by a thread to check for signals pending on a notification object or messages pending on an endpoint without blocking. This system call works only on endpoints and notification object capabilities, raising a fault (see section 6.2) when attempted with other capability types.
- seL4\_Yield() is the only system call that does not require a capability to be used. It forfeits the remainder of the calling thread's timeslice and causes invocation of the kernel's scheduler. If there are no other runnable threads with the same priority as the caller, the calling thread will immediately be scheduled with a fresh timeslice.

### 2.3 Kernel Objects

In this section we give a brief overview of the kernel-implemented object types whose instances (also simply called *objects*) can be invoked by applications. The interface to these objects forms the interface to the kernel itself. The creation and use of kernel services is achieved by the creation, manipulation, and combination of these kernel objects:

- **CNodes** (see Chapter 3) store capabilities, giving threads permission to invoke methods on particular objects. Each CNode has a fixed number of slots, always a power of two, determined when the CNode is created. Slots can be empty or contain a capability.
- **Thread Control Blocks** (TCBs; see Chapter 6) represent a thread of execution in seL4. Threads are the unit of execution that is scheduled, blocked, unblocked, etc., depending on the application's interaction with other threads.
- **Endpoints** (see Chapter 4) facilitate message-passing communication between threads. IPC is synchronous: A thread trying to send or receive on an endpoint blocks until the message can be delivered. This means that message delivery only happens if a sender and a receiver rendezvous at the endpoint, and the kernel can deliver the message with a single copy (or without copying for short messages using only registers).

A capability to an endpoint can be restricted to be send-only or receive-only. Additionally, Endpoint capabilities can have the grant right, which allows sending capabilities as part of the message.

**Notification Objects** (see Chapter 5) provide a simple signalling mechanism. A Notification is a word-size array of flags, each of which behaves like a binary semaphore. Operations are *signalling* a subset of flags in a single operation, polling to check

any flags, and blocking until any are signalled. Notification capabilities can be signal-only or wait-only.

- Virtual Address Space Objects (see Chapter 7) are used to construct a virtual address space (or VSpace) for one or more threads. These objects largely directly correspond to those of the hardware, and as such are architecture-dependent. The kernel also includes ASID Pool and ASID Control objects for tracking the status of address spaces.
- **Interrupt Objects** (see Chapter 8) give applications the ability to receive and acknowledge interrupts from hardware devices. Initially, there is a capability to IRQControl, which allows for the creation of IRQHandler capabilities. An IRQHandler capability permits the management of a specific interrupt source associated with a specific device. It is delegated to a device driver to access an interrupt source. The IRQHandler object allows threads to wait for and acknowledge individual interrupts.
- **Untyped Memory** (see Section 2.4) is the foundation of memory allocation in the seL4 kernel. Untyped memory capabilities have a single method which allows the creation of new kernel objects. If the method succeeds, the calling thread gains access to capabilities to the newly-created objects. Additionally, untyped memory objects can be divided into a group of smaller untyped memory objects allowing delegation of part (or all) of the system's memory. We discuss memory management in general in the following sections.

### 2.4 Kernel Memory Allocation

The seL4 microkernel does not dynamically allocate memory for kernel objects. Instead, objects must be explicitly created from application-controlled memory regions via Untyped Memory capabilities. Applications must have explicit authority to memory (through these Untyped Memory capabilities) in order to create new objects, and all objects consume a fixed amount of memory once created. These mechanisms can be used to precisely control the specific amount of physical memory available to applications, including being able to enforce isolation of physical memory access between applications or a device. There are no arbitrary resource limits in the kernel apart from those dictated by the hardware<sup>1</sup>, and so many denial-of-service attacks via resource exhaustion are avoided.

At boot time, seL4 pre-allocates the memory required for the kernel itself, including the code, data, and stack sections (seL4 is a single kernel-stack operating system). It then creates an initial user thread (with an appropriate address and capability space). The kernel than hands all remaining memory to the initial thread in the form of capabilities to Untyped Memory, and some additional capabilities to kernel objects that were required to bootstrap the initial thread. These Untyped Memory regions can then be split into smaller regions or other kernel objects using the seL4\_Untyped\_Retype() method; the created objects are termed *children* of the original untyped memory object.

 $<sup>^{1}</sup>$ The treatment of virtual ASIDs imposes a fixed number of address spaces. This limitation is to be removed in future versions of seL4.

The user-level application that creates an object using seL4\_Untyped\_Retype() receives full authority over the resulting object. It can then delegate all or part of the authority it possesses over this object to one or more of its clients.

#### 2.4.1 Reusing Memory

The model described thus far is sufficient for applications to allocate kernel objects, distribute authority among client applications, and obtain various kernel services provided by these objects. This alone is sufficient for a simple static system configuration.

The seL4 kernel also allows Untyped Memory regions to be reused. Reusing a region of memory is allowed only when there are no dangling references (i.e., capabilities) left to the objects inside that memory. The kernel tracks *capability derivations*, i.e., the children generated by the methods seL4\_Untyped\_Retype(), seL4\_CNode\_Mint(), seL4\_CNode\_Copy(), and seL4\_CNode\_Mutate().

The tree structure so generated is termed the *capability derivation tree* (CDT).<sup>2</sup> For example, when a user creates new kernel objects by retyping untyped memory, the newly created capabilities would be inserted into the CDT as children of the untyped memory capability.

For each Untyped Memory region, the kernel keeps a *watermark* recording how much of the region has previously been allocated. Whenever a user requests the kernel to create new objects in an untyped memory region, the kernel will carry out one of two actions: if there are already existing objects allocated in the region, the kernel will allocate the new objects at the current watermark level, and increase the watermark. If all objects previously allocated in the region have been deleted, the kernel will reset the watermark and start allocating new objects from the beginning of the region again.

Finally, the seL4\_CNode\_Revoke() method provided by CNode objects destroys all capabilities derived from the argument capability. Revoking the last capability to a kernel object triggers the *destroy* operation on the now unreferenced object. This simply cleans up any in-kernel dependencies between it, other objects and the kernel.

By calling seL4\_CNode\_Revoke() on the original capability to an untyped memory object, the user removes all of the untyped memory object's children—that is, all capabilities pointing to objects in the untyped memory region. Thus, after this invocation there are no valid references to any object within the untyped region, and the region may be safely retyped and reused.

 $<sup>^{2}</sup>$ Although the CDT conceptually is a separate data structure, it is implemented as part of the CNode object and so requires no additional kernel meta-data.

# **Capability Spaces**

Recall from Section 2.1 that seL4 implements a capability-based access control model. Each userspace thread has an associated *capability space* (CSpace) that contains the capabilities that the thread possesses, thereby governing which resources the thread can access.

Recall that capabilities reside within kernel-managed objects known as CNodes. A CNode is a table of slots, each of which may contain a capability. This may include capabilities to further CNodes, forming a directed graph. Conceptually a thread's CSpace is the portion of the directed graph that is reachable starting with the CNode capability that is its CSpace root.

A CSpace address refers to an individual slot (in some CNode in the CSpace), which may or may not contain a capability. Threads refer to capabilities in their CSpaces (e.g. when making system calls) using the address of the slot that holds the capability in question. An address in a CSpace is the concatenation of the indices of the CNode capabilities forming the path to the destination slot; we discuss this further in Section 3.3.

Recall that capabilities can be copied and moved within CSpaces, and also sent in messages (message sending will be described in detail in Section 4.2.2). Furthermore, new capabilities can be *minted* from old ones with a subset of their rights. Recall, from Section 2.4.1, that seL4 maintains a *capability derivation tree* (CDT) in which it tracks the relationship between these copied capabilities and the originals. The revoke method removes all capabilities (in all CSpaces) that were derived from a selected capability. This mechanism can be used by servers to restore sole authority to an object they have made available to clients, or by managers of untyped memory to destroy the objects in that memory so it can be retyped.

seL4 requires the programmer to manage all in-kernel data structures, including C-Spaces, from userspace. This means that the userspace programmer is responsible for constructing CSpaces as well as addressing capabilities within them. This chapter first discusses capability and CSpace management, before discussing how capabilities are addressed within CSpaces, i.e. how applications can refer to individual capabilities within their CSpaces when invoking methods.

### 3.1 Capability and CSpace Management

#### 3.1.1 CSpace Creation

CSpaces are created by creating and manipulating CNode objects. When creating a CNode the user must specify the number of slots that it will have, and this determines the amount of memory that it will use. Each slot requires 16 bytes of physical memory and has the capacity to hold exactly one capability. Like any other object, a CNode must be created by calling seL4\_Untyped\_Retype() on an appropriate amount of untyped memory (see Section 10.3.29). The caller must therefore have a capability to enough untyped memory as well as enough free capability slots available in existing CNodes for the seL4\_Untyped\_Retype() invocation to succeed.

#### 3.1.2 CNode Methods

Capabilities are managed largely through invoking CNode methods.

CNodes support the following methods:

- seL4\_CNode\_Mint() creates a new capability in a specified CNode slot from an existing capability. The newly created capability may have fewer rights than the original and a different guard (see Section 3.3.1). seL4\_CNode\_Mint() can also create a badged capability (see Section 4.2.1) from an unbadged one.
- seL4\_CNode\_Copy() is similar to seL4\_CNode\_Mint(), but the newly created capability
  has the same badge and guard as the original.
- seL4\_CNode\_Move() moves a capability between two specified capability slots. You
  cannot move a capability to the slot in which it is currently.
- seL4\_CNode\_Mutate() can move a capability similarly to seL4\_CNode\_Move() and also reduce its rights similarly to seL4\_CNode\_Mint(), although without an original copy remaining.
- seL4\_CNode\_Rotate() moves two capabilities between three specified capability slots. It is essentially two seL4\_CNode\_Move() invocations: one from the second specified slot to the first, and one from the third to the second. The first and third specified slots may be the same, in which case the capability in it is swapped with the capability in the second slot. The method is atomic; either both or neither capabilities are moved.
- seL4\_CNode\_Delete() removes a capability from the specified slot.
- seL4\_CNode\_Revoke() is equivalent to calling seL4\_CNode\_Delete() on each derived child of the specified capability. It has no effect on the capability itself, except in very specific circumstances outlined in Section 3.2.
- seL4\_CNode\_SaveCaller() moves a kernel-generated reply capability of the current thread from the special TCB slot it was created in, into the designated CSpace slot.

seL4\_CNode\_Recycle() is similar to seL4\_CNode\_Revoke(), except that it also resets
 some aspects of the object to its initial state.

#### 3.1.3 Capability Rights

As mentioned previously, some capability types have *access rights* associated with them. Currently, access rights are associated with capabilities for Endpoints (see Chapter 4), Notifications (see Chapter 5) and Pages (see Chapter 7). The access rights associated with a capability determine the methods that can be invoked. seL4 supports three orthogonal access rights, which are Read, Write and Grant. The meaning of each right is interpreted relative to the various object types, as detailed in Table 3.1.

When an object is first created, the initial capability that refers to it carries the maximum set of access rights. Other, less-powerful capabilities may be manufactured from this original capability, using methods such as seL4\_CNode\_Mint() and seL4\_-CNode\_Mutate(). If a greater set of rights than the source capability is specified for the destination capability in either of these invocations, the destination rights are silently downgraded to those of the source.

Type	Read	Write	Grant
Endpoint	Required to receive.	Required to send.	Required to send ca- pabilities (including reply capabilities).
Notification	Required to wait.	Required to signal.	N/A
Page	Required to map the page readable.	Required to map the page writable.	N/A

Table 3.1: seL4 access rights.

#### 3.1.4 Capability Derivation Tree

As mentioned in Section 2.4.1, seL4 keeps track of capability derivations in a capability derivation tree.

Various methods, such as seL4\_CNode\_Copy() or seL4\_CNode\_Mint(), may be used to create derived capabilities. Not all capabilities support derivation. In general, only *original* capabilities support derivation invocations, but there are exceptions. Table 3.2 summarises the conditions that must be met for capability derivation to succeed for the various capability types, and how capability-derivation failures are reported in each case. The capability types not listed can be derived once.

Figure 3.1 shows an example capability derivation tree that illustrates a standard scenario: the top level is a large untyped capability, the second level splits this capability into two regions covered by their own untyped caps, both are children of the first level. The third level on the left is a copy of the level 2 untyped capability. Untyped capabilities when copied always create children, never siblings. In this scenario, the untyped capability was typed into two separate objects, creating two capabilities on

Сар Туре	Conditions for Derivation	Error Code on Derivation Failure
ReplyCap	Cannot be derived	Dependent on syscall
IRQControl	Cannot be derived	Dependent on syscall
Untyped	Must not have children (Sec-	seL4_RevokeFirst
	tion $3.2$ )	
Page Table	Must be mapped	${\tt seL4\_II1egal0peration}$
Page Directory	Must be mapped	${\tt seL4_Illegal0}$ peration
IO Page Table (IA-32	Must be mapped	${\tt seL4\_Illegal0peration}$
only)		

Table 3.2: Capability derivation.




Figure 3.1: Example capability derivation tree.

level 4, both are the original capability to the respective object, both are children of the untyped capability they were created from.

Ordinary original capabilities can have one level of derived capabilities. Further copies of these derived capabilities will create siblings, in this case remaining on level 5. There is an exception to this scheme for Endpoint and Notification capabilities — they support an additional layer of depth though *badging*. The original Endpoint or *Notification* capability will be unbadged. Using the mint method, a copy of the capability with a specific *badge* can be created (see Section 4.2.1, Section 5.1). This new, badged capability to the same object is treated as an original capability (the "original badged endpoint capability") and supports one level of derived children like other capabilities.

## 3.2 Deletion, Revocation, and Recycling

Capabilities in seL4 can be deleted and revoked. Both methods primarily affect capabilities, but they can have side effects on objects in the system where the deletion or revocation results in the destruction of the last capability to an object. As described above, seL4\_CNode\_Delete() will remove a capability from the specified CNode slot. Usually, this is all that happens. If, however, it was the last typed capability to an object, this object will now be destroyed by the kernel, cleaning up all remaining in-kernel references and preparing the memory for re-use.

If the object to be destroyed was a capability container, i.e. a TCB or CNode, the destruction process will delete each capability held in the container, prior to destroying the container. This may result in the destruction of further objects if the contained capabilities are the last capabilities.<sup>1</sup>

The seL4\_CNode\_Revoke() method will seL4\_CNode\_Delete() all CDT children of the specified capability, but will leave the capability itself intact. If any of the revoked child capabilities were the last capabilities to an object, the appropriate destroy operation is triggered.

Note: seL4\_CNode\_Revoke() may only partially complete in two specific circumstances. The first being where a CNode containing the last capability to the TCB of the thread performing the revoke (or the last capability to the TCB itself) is deleted as a result of the revoke. In this case the thread performing the revoke is destroyed during the revoke and the revoke does not complete. The second circumstance is where the storage containing the capability that is the target of the revoke is deleted as a result of the revoke. In this case, the authority to perform the revoke is removed during the operation and the operation stops part way through. Both these scenarios can be and should be avoided at user-level by construction.

The seL4\_CNode\_Recycle() method can be used to partially reset an object without fully removing all capabilities to it. Invoking it will first revoke all child capabilities, but it will not remove siblings or parents. Only if, after revocation, the capability is the last typed capability to the object, the same destroy operation as in seL4\_-CNode\_Delete() will be executed. Otherwise, not all aspects of the object will be reset: for badged endpoint capabilities, only IPC with this badge will be cancelled in the endpoint, for TCBs the capabilities will be reset, for CNodes, the guard on the capability will be reset.

Note that for page tables and page directories, neither seL4\_CNode\_Revoke() nor seL4\_CNode\_Recycle() will revoke frame capabilities mapped into the address space. They will only be unmapped from the space.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>The recursion is limited as if the last capability to a CNode is found within the container, the found CNode is not destroyed. Instead, the found CNode is made unreachable by moving the capability pointing to the found CNode into the found cnode itself, by swapping the capability with the first capability in the found cnode, and then trying to delete the swapped capability instead. This breaks the recursion.

The result of this approach is that deleting the last cap to the root CNode of a CSpace does not recursively delete the entire CSpace. Instead, it deletes the root CNode, and the branches of the tree become unreachable, potentially including the deleting of some of the unreachable CNode's caps to make space for the self-referring capability. The practical consequence of this approach is that CSpace deletion requires user-level to delete the tree leaf first if unreachable CNodes are to be avoided. Alternatively, any resulting unreachable CNodes can be cleaned up via revoking a covering untyped capability, however this latter approach may be more complex to arrange by construction at user-level.

### 3.3 CSpace Addressing

When performing a system call, a thread specifies to the kernel the capability to be invoked by giving an address in its CSpace. This address refers to the specific slot in the caller's CSpace that contains the capability to be invoked.

CSpaces are designed to permit sparsity, and the process of looking-up a capability address must be efficient. Therefore, CSpaces are implemented as *guarded page tables*.

As explained earlier, a CSpace is simply a hierarchy of CNode objects, and each CNode is simply a table of slots that each contain either a capability or a reference to another CNode. The kernel stores a capability to the root CNode of each thread's CSpace in the thread's TCB. Conceptually, a CNode capability stores not only a reference to the CNode to which it refers, but also carries two values, its *guard* and *radix*.

#### 3.3.1 Capability Address Lookup

Like a virtual memory address, a capability address is simply an integer. Rather than referring to a location of physical memory (as does a virtual memory address), a capability address refers to a capability slot. When looking up a capability address presented by a userspace thread, the kernel first consults the CNode capability in the thread's TCB that defines the root of the thread's CSpace. It then compares that CNode's guard value against the most significant bits of the capability address. If the two values are different, lookup fails. Otherwise, the kernel then uses the next most-significant radix bits of the capability refers. The slot s identified by these next radix bits might contain another CNode capability or contain something else (including nothing). If s contains a CNode capability c and there are remaining bits (following the radix bits) in the capability address that have yet to be translated, the lookup process repeats, starting from the CNode capability c and using these remaining bits of the capability address in question refers to the capability slot s.

Figure 3.2 demonstrates a valid CSpace with the following features:

- a top level CNode object with a 12-bit guard set to 0x000 and 256 slots;
- a top level CNode with direct object references;
- a top level CNode with two second-level CNode references;
- second level CNodes with different guards and slot counts;
- a second level CNode that contains a reference to a top level CNode;
- a second level CNode that contains a reference to another CNode where there are some bits remaining to be translated;
- a second level CNode that contains a reference to another CNode where there are no bits remaining to be translated; and
- object references in the second level CNodes.




Figure 3.2: An example CSpace demonstrating object references at all levels, various guard and radix sizes and internal CNode references.

It should be noted that Figure 3.2 demonstrates only what is possible, not what is usually practical. Although the CSpace is legal, it would be reasonably difficult to work with due to the small number of slots and the circular references within it.

#### 3.3.2 Addressing Capabilities

A capability address is stored in a CPointer (abbreviated CPTR), which is an unsigned integer variable. Capabilities are addressed in accordance with the translation algorithm described above. Two special cases involve addressing CNode capabilities themselves and addressing a range of capability slots.

Recall that the translation algorithm described above will traverse CNode capabilities while there are address bits remaining to be translated. Therefore, in order to address a CNode capability, the user must supply not only a capability address but also specify the maximum number of bits of the capability address that are to be translated, called the *depth limit*.

Certain methods, such as seL4\_Untyped\_Retype(), require the user to provide a range of capability slots. This is done by providing a base capability address, which refers to the first slot in the range, together with a window size parameter, specifying the number of slots (with consecutive addresses, following the base slot) in the range.

Figure 3.3 depicts an example CSpace. In order to illustrate these ideas, we determine the address of each of the 10 capabilities in this CSpace.




Figure 3.3: An arbitrary CSpace layout.

- **Cap A.** The first CNode has a 4-bit guard set to 0x0, and an 8-bit radix. Cap A resides in slot 0x60 so it may be referred to by any address of the form 0x060xxxxx (where xxxxx is any number, because the translation process terminates after translating the first 12 bits of the address). For simplicity, we usually adopt the address 0x06000000.
- **Cap B.** Again, the first CNode has a 4-bit guard set to 0x0, and an 8-bit radix. The second CNode is reached via the L2 CNode Cap. It also has a 4-bit guard of 0x0 and Cap B resides at index 0x60. Hence, Cap B's address is 0x00F06000. Translation of this address terminates after the first 24 bits.
- **Cap C.** This capability is addressed via both CNodes. The third CNode is reached via the L3 CNode Cap, which resides at index 0x00 of the second CNode. The third CNode has no guard and Cap C is at index 0x60. Hence, its address is 0x00F00060. Translation of this address leaves 0 bits untranslated.
- **Caps C–G.** This range of capability slots is addressed by providing a base address (which refers to the slot containing Cap C) of 0x00F00060 and a window size of 5.
- L2 CNode Cap. Recall that to address a CNode capability, the user must supply not only a capability address but also specify the depth limit, which is the maximum number of bits to be translated. L2 CNode Cap resides at offset 0x0F of the first CNode, which has a 4-bit guard of 0x0. Hence, its address is 0x00F00000, with a depth limit of 12 bits.
- L3 CNode Cap. This capability resides at index 0x00 of the second CNode, which is reached by the L2 CNode Cap. The second CNode has a 4-bit guard of 0x0. Hence, the capability's address is 0x00F00000 with a depth limit of 24 bits. Note that the addresses of the L2 and L3 CNode Caps are the same, but that their depth limits are different.

In summary, to refer to any capability (or slot) in a CSpace, the user must supply its address. When the capability might be a CNode, the user must also supply a depth

limit. To specify a range of capability slots, the user supplies a starting address and a window size.

### 3.4 Lookup Failure Description

When a capability lookup fails, a description of the failure is given to either the calling thread or the thread's exception handler in its IPC buffer. The format of the description is always the same but may occur at varying offsets in the IPC buffer depending on how the error occurred. The description format is explained below. The first word indicates the type of lookup failure and the meaning of later words depend on this.

#### 3.4.1 Invalid Root

A CSpace CPTR root (within which a capability was to be looked up) is invalid. For example, the capability is not a CNode cap.

Data	Meaning
Offset + O	seL4_InvalidRoot

#### 3.4.2 Missing Capability

A capability required for an invocation is not present or does not have sufficient rights.

Data	Meaning
Offset + 0	seL4_MissingCapability
Offset + 1	Bits left

#### 3.4.3 Depth Mismatch

When resolving a capability, a CNode was traversed that resolved more bits than was left to decode in the CPTR or a non-CNode capability was encountered while there were still bits remaining to be looked up.

Data	Meaning
Offset + 0 Offset + 1	seL4_DepthMismatch Bits of CPTR remaining to decode
Offset + 2	Bits that the current CNode being traversed resolved

#### 3.4.4 Guard Mismatch

When resolving a capability, a CNode was traversed with a guard size larger than the number of bits remaining or the CNode's guard did not match the next bits of the CPTR being resolved.

Data	Meaning
Offset + O	seL4_GuardMismatch
Offset + 1	Bits of CPTR remaining to decode
Offset + 2	The CNode's guard
Offset + 3	The CNode's guard size

# Message Passing (IPC)

The seL4 microkernel provides a message-passing IPC mechanism for communication between threads. The same mechanism is also used for communication with kernelprovided services. Messages are sent by invoking a capability to a kernel object. Messages sent to Endpoint are destined for other threads, while messages sent to other objects are processed by the kernel. This chapter describes the common message format, endpoints, and how they can be used for communication between applications.

### 4.1 Message Registers

Each message contains a number of message words and optionally a number of capabilities. The message words are sent to or received from a thread by placing them in its *message registers*. The message registers are numbered and the first few message registers are implemented using physical CPU registers, while the rest are backed by a fixed region of memory called the *IPC buffer*. The reason for this design is efficiency: very short messages need not use the memory. The physical CPU registers used for the message registers are described in Table 4.1 for x86 and Table 4.2 for ARM. The IPC buffer is assigned to the calling thread (see Section 6.1 and Section 10.3.23).

Role	CPU Register
Capability register (in)	ebx
Badge register $(out)$	ebx
Message tag $(in/out)$	esi
Message register 1 $(in/out)$	edi
Message register 2 $(in/out)$	ebp

**Table 4.1:** Physical register allocation for IPC messages on the x86architecture.

Every IPC message also has a tag (structure seL4\_MessageInfo\_t). The tag consists of four fields: the label, message length, number of capabilities (the extraCaps field) and the capsUnwrapped field. The message length and number of capabilities determine either the number of message registers and capabilities that the sending thread wishes

Role	CPU Register
Capability register (in)	rO
Badge register <i>(out)</i>	rO
Message tag $(in/out)$	r1
Message register $1-4$ (in/out)	r2 - r5

**Table 4.2:** Physical register allocation for IPC messages on the ARM architecture.

to transfer, or the number of message registers and capabilities that were actually transferred. The label is not interpreted by the kernel and is passed unmodified as the first data payload of the message. The label may, for example, be used to specify a requested operation. The capsUnwrapped field is used only on the receive side, to indicate the manner in which capabilities were received. It is described in Section 4.2.2.

Туре	Name	Description
seL4_MessageInfo_t	tag	Message tag
seL4_Word[]	msg	Message contents
seL4_Word	userData	Base address of the structure, used by supporting user libraries
$seL4_CPtr[]$ (in)	caps	Capabilities to transfer
seL4_CapData_t[] (out)	badges	Badges for endpoint capabilities re- ceived
seL4_CPtr	receiveCNode	CPTR to a CNode from which to find the receive slot
seL4_CPtr	receiveIndex	CPTR to the receive slot relative to <b>re-</b> ceiveCNode
seL4_Word	receiveDepth	Number of bits of <b>receiveIndex</b> to use

Table 4.3: Fields of the seL4\_IPCBuffer structure. Note that badges and caps use the same area of memory in the structure.

The kernel assumes that the IPC buffer contains a structure of type seL4\_IPCBuffer as defined in Table 4.3. The kernel uses as many physical registers as possible to transfer IPC messages. When more arguments are transferred than physical message registers are available, the kernel begins using the IPC buffer's msg field to transfer arguments. However, it leaves room in this array for the physical message registers. For example, if an IPC transfer or kernel object invocation required 4 message registers (and there are only 2 physical message registers available on this architecture) then arguments 1 and 2 would be transferred via message registers and arguments 3 and 4 would be in msg[2] and msg[3]. This allows the user-level object-invocation stubs to copy the arguments passed in physical registers to the space left in the msg array if desired. The situation is similar for the tag field. There is space for this field in the seL4\_IPCBuffer structure, which the kernel ignores. User level stubs may wish to copy the message tag from its CPU register to this field, although the user level stubs provided with the kernel do not do this.

## 4.2 Endpoints

Endpoints allow a small amount of data and capabilities (namely the IPC buffer) to be transferred between two threads. Endpoint objects are invoked directly using the seL4 system calls described in Section 2.2.

IPC Endpoints uses a rendezvous model and as such is synchronous and blocking. An Endpoint object may queue threads either to send or to receive. If no receiver is ready, threads performing the seL4\_Send() or seL4\_Call() system calls will wait in a queue for the first available receiver. Likewise, if no sender is ready, threads performing the seL4\_Recv() system call or the second half of seL4\_ReplyRecv() will wait for the first available sender.

#### 4.2.1 Endpoint Badges

Endpoint capabilities may be *minted* to create a new endpoint capability with a *badge* attached to it, a data word chosen by the invoker of the *mint* operation. When a message is sent to an endpoint using a badged capability, the badge is transferred to the receiving thread's **badge** register.

An endpoint capability with a zero badge is said to be *unbadged*. Such a capability can be badged with the seL4\_CNode\_Mutate() or seL4\_CNode\_Mint() invocations on the CNode containing the capability. Endpoint capabilities with badges cannot be unbadged, rebadged or used to create child capabilities with different badges.

#### 4.2.2 Capability Transfer

Messages may contain capabilities, which will be transferred to the receiver, provided that the endpoint capability invoked by the sending thread has Grant rights. An attempt to send capabilities using an endpoint capability without the Grant right will result in transfer of the raw message, without any capability transfer.

Capabilities to be sent in a message are specified in the sending thread's IPC buffer in the caps field. Each entry in that array is interpreted as a CPTR in the sending thread's capability space. The number of capabilities to send is specified in the extraCaps field of the message tag.

The receiver specifies the slot in which it is willing to receive a capability, with three fields within the IPC buffer: receiveCNode, receiveIndex and receiveDepth. These fields specify the root CNode, capability address and number of bits to resolve, respectively, to find the slot in which to put the capability. Capability addressing is described in Section 3.3.2.

A received capability has the same rights as the original, except if the *receiving* endpoint capability lacks the Write right. In this case, the rights on the sent capability are *diminished*, by stripping the Write right from the received copy of the capability.

Note that receiving threads may specify only one receive slot, whereas a sending thread may include multiple capabilities in the message. Messages containing more than one capability may be interpreted by kernel objects. They may also be sent to receiving threads in the case where some of the extra capabilities in the message can be *unwrapped*.

If the n-th capability in the message refers to the endpoint through which the message is sent, the capability is *unwrapped*: its badge is placed into the n-th position of the receiver's badges array, and the kernel sets the n-th bit (counting from the least significant) in the **capsUnwrapped** field of the message tag. The capability itself is not transferred, so the receive slot may be used for another capability.

If a receiver gets a message whose tag has an extraCaps of 2 and a capsUnwrapped of 2, then the first capability in the message was transferred to the specified receive slot and the second capability was unwrapped, placing its badge in badges[1]. There may have been a third capability in the sender's message which could not be unwrapped.

#### 4.2.3 Errors

Errors in capability transfers can occur at two places: in the send phase or in the receive phase. In the send phase, all capabilities that the caller is attempting to send are looked up to ensure that they exist before the send is initiated in the kernel. If the lookup fails for any reason, seL4\_Send() and seL4\_Call() system calls immediately abort and no IPC or capability transfer takes place. The system call will return a lookup failure error as described in Section 10.1.

In the receive phase, seL4 transfers capabilities in the order that they are found in the sending thread's IPC buffer **caps** array and terminates as soon as an error is encountered. Possible error conditions are:

- A source capability cannot be looked up. Although the presence of the source capabilities is checked when the sending thread performs the send system call, this error may still occur. The sending thread may have been blocked on the endpoint for some time before it was paired with a receiving thread. During this time, its CSpace may have changed and the source capability pointers may no longer be valid.
- The destination slot cannot be looked up. Unlike the send system call, the seL4\_-Recv() system call does not check that the destination slot exists and is empty before it initiates the receive. Hence, the seL4\_Recv() system call will not fail with an error if the destination slot is invalid and will instead transfer badged capabilities until an attempt to save a capability to the destination slot is made.
- The capability being transferred cannot be derived. See Section 3.1.4 for details.

An error will not void the entire transfer, it will just end it prematurely. The capabilities processed before the failure are still transferred and the extraCaps field in the receiver's IPC buffer is set to the number of capabilities transferred up to failure. No error message will be returned to the receiving thread in any of the above cases.

## Notifications

Notifications are a simple, non-blocking signalling mechanism that logically represents a set of binary semaphores.

### 5.1 Notification Objects

A Notification object contains a single data word, called the *notification word*. Such an object supports two operations: seL4\_Signal() and seL4\_Wait().

Notification capabilities can be badged, using seL4\_CNode\_Mutate() or seL4\_CNode\_-Mint(), just like Endpoint capabilities (see Section 4.2.1). As with Endpoint capabilities, badged Notification capabilities cannot be unbadged, rebadged or used to create child capabilities with different badges.

## 5.2 Signalling, Polling and Waiting

The seL4\_Signal() method updates the notification word by bit-wise or-ing it with the *badge* of the invoked notification capability. It also unblocks the first thread waiting on the notification (if any). As such, seL4\_Signal() works like concurrently signalling multiple semaphores (those indicated by the bits set in the badge). If the signal sender capability was unbadged or 0-badged, the operation degrades to just waking up the first thread waiting on the notification (also see below).

The seL4\_Wait() method works similarly to a select-style wait on the set of semaphores: If the notification word is zero at the time seL4\_Wait() is called, the invoker blocks. Else, the call returns immediately, setting the notification word to zero and returning to the invoker the previous notification-word value.

The seL4\_Poll() is the same as seL4\_Wait(), except if no signals are pending (the notification word is 0) the call will return immediately without blocking.

If threads are waiting on the Notification object at the time seL4\_Signal() is invoked, the first queued thread receives the notification. All other threads keep waiting until the next time the notification is signalled.

If seL4\_Signal() is invoked with an unbadged or 0-badged capability, the first queued thread is unblocked with a zero return value. If no thread is waiting, the seL4\_Signal() operation with an unbadged capability has no effect.

## 5.3 Binding Notifications

Notification objects and TCBs can be bound together in a 1-to-1 relationship through the seL4\_TCB\_BindNotification() invocation. When a Notification is bound to a TCB, signals to that notification object will be delivered even if the thread is receiving from an IPC endpoint. To distinguish whether the received message was a notification or an IPC, developers should check the badge value. By reserving a specific badge (or range of badges) for capabilities to the bound notification — distinct from endpoint badges — the message source can be determined.

Once a notification has been bound, the only thread that may perform **seL4\_Wait()** on the notification is the bound thread.

## **Threads and Execution**

### 6.1 Threads

seL4 provides threads to represent an execution context and manage processor time. A thread is represented in seL4 by its thread control block object (TCB). Each TCB has an associated CSpace (see Chapter 3) and VSpace (see Chapter 7) which may be shared with other threads. A TCB may also have an IPC buffer (see Chapter 4), which is used to pass extra arguments during IPC or kernel object invocation that do not fit in the architecture-defined message registers. While it is not compulsory that a thread has an IPC buffer, it will not be able to perform most kernel invocations, as they require cap transfer. Each thread belongs to exactly one security domain (see Section 6.3).

#### 6.1.1 Thread Creation

Like other objects, TCBs are created with the seL4\_Untyped\_Retype() method (see Section 2.4). A newly created thread is initially inactive. It is configured by setting its CSpace and VSpace with the seL4\_TCB\_SetSpace() or seL4\_TCB\_Configure() methods and then calling seL4\_TCB\_WriteRegisters() with an initial stack pointer and instruction pointer. The thread can then be activated either by setting the resume\_target parameter in the seL4\_TCB\_WriteRegisters() invocation to true or by seperately calling the seL4\_TCB\_Resume() method.

#### 6.1.2 Thread Deactivation

The seL4\_TCB\_Suspend() method deactivates a thread. Suspended threads can later be resumed. Their suspended state can be retrieved with the seL4\_TCB\_ReadRegisters() and seL4\_TCB\_CopyRegisters() methods. They can also be reconfigured and reused or left suspended indefinitely if not needed. Threads will be automatically suspended when the last capability to their TCB is deleted.

## 6.1.3 Scheduling

seL4 uses a preemptive round-robin scheduler with 256 priority levels. When a thread creates or modifies another thread, it can only set the other thread's priority to be lower than or equal to its own. Thread priority can be set with seL4\_TCB\_Configure() and seL4\_TCB\_SetPriority() methods.

#### 6.1.4 Exceptions

Each thread has an associated exception-handler endpoint. If the thread causes an exception, the kernel creates an IPC message with the relevant details and sends this to the endpoint. This thread can then take the appropriate action. Fault IPC messages are described in Section 6.2.

In order to enable exception handlers, a capability to the exception-handler endpoint must exist in the CSpace of the thread that generates the exception. The exception-handler endpoint can be set with the seL4\_TCB\_SetSpace() or seL4\_TCB\_Configure() method. With these methods, a capability address for the exception handler can be associated with a thread. This address is then used to lookup the handler endpoint when an exception is generated. Note, however, that these methods make no attempt to check whether an endpoint capability exists at the specified address in the CSpace of the thread. The capability is only looked up when an exception actually happens and if the lookup fails then no exception message is delivered and the thread is suspended indefinitely.

The exception endpoint must have send and grant rights. Replying to the exception message restarts the thread. For certain exception types, the contents of the reply message may be used to set the values in the registers of the thread being restarted. See Section 6.2 for details.

#### 6.1.5 Message Layout of the Read-/Write-Registers Methods

The registers of a thread can be read and written with the seL4\_TCB\_ReadRegisters() and seL4\_TCB\_WriteRegisters() methods. The register contents are transferred via the IPC buffer. The IPC buffer locations that registers are copied to/from are given below.

Register	IPC Buffer location
EIP	IPCBuffer[0]
ESP	IPCBuffer[1]
EFLAGS	IPCBuffer[2]
EAX	IPCBuffer[3]
EBX	IPCBuffer[4]
ECX	IPCBuffer[5]
EDX	IPCBuffer[6]
ESI	IPCBuffer[7]
EDI	IPCBuffer[8]
EBP	IPCBuffer[9]
TLS_BASE	IPCBuffer[10]
FS	IPCBuffer[11]
GS	IPCBuffer[12]

IA-	3	2
-----	---	---

## $\mathbf{ARM}$

Register	IPC Buffer location
PC	IPCBuffer[0]
SP	IPCBuffer[1]
CPSR	IPCBuffer[2]
RO-R1	IPCBuffer[3-4]
R8-R12	IPCBuffer[5-9]
R2-R7	IPCBuffer[10-15]
R14	IPCBuffer[16]

## 6.2 Faults

A thread's actions may result in a fault. Faults are delivered to the thread's exception handler so that it can take the appropriate action. The fault type is specified in the message label and is one of: seL4\_CapFault, seL4\_VMFault, seL4\_UnknownSyscall, seL4\_UserException or seL4\_Interrupt.

## 6.2.1 Capability Faults

Capability faults may occur in two places. Firstly, a capability fault can occur when lookup of a capability referenced by a seL4\_Call() or seL4\_Send() system call failed (seL4\_NBSend() calls on invalid capabilities silently fail). In this case, the capability on which the fault occurred may be the capability being invoked or an extra capability passed in the caps field in the IPC buffer.

Secondly, a capability fault can occur when seL4\_Recv() or seL4\_NBRecv() is called on a capability that does not exist, is not an endpoint or notification capability or does not have receive permissions.

Replying to the fault IPC will restart the faulting thread. The contents of the IPC message are given in Table 6.1.

Meaning	IPC buffer Location
Address at which to restart execution	IPCBuffer[0]
Capability address	IPCBuffer[1]
In receive phase (1 if the fault happened	IPCBuffer[2]
during a receive system call, 0 otherwise)	
Lookup failure description. As described	IPCBuffer[3]
in Section 3.4	

 Table 6.1: Contents of an IPC message.

## 6.2.2 Unknown Syscall

This fault occurs when a thread executes a system call with a syscall number that is unknown to seL4. The register set of the faulting thread is passed to the thread's exception handler so that it may, for example, emulate the system call if a thread is being virtualised.

Replying to the fault IPC allows the thread to be restarted and/or the thread's register set to be modified. If the reply has a label of zero, the thread will be restarted. Additionally, if the message length is non-zero, the faulting thread's register set will be updated as shown in Table 6.2 and Table 6.3. In this case, the number of registers updated is controlled with the length field of the message tag.

#### $\mathbf{ARM}$

Value sent	Register set by reply	IPC buffer location
R0-R7	(same)	IPCBuffer[0-7]
FaultInstruction	(same)	IPCBuffer[8]
SP	(same)	IPCBuffer[9]
LR	(same)	IPCBuffer[10]
CPSR	(same)	IPCBuffer[11]
Syscall number	—	IPCBuffer[12]

 Table 6.2:
 Unknown system call outcome on the ARM architecture.

Value sent	Register set by reply	IPC buffer location
EAX	(same)	IPCBuffer[0]
EBX	(same)	IPCBuffer[1]
ECX	(same)	IPCBuffer[2]
EDX	(same)	IPCBuffer[3]
ESI	(same)	IPCBuffer[4]
EDI	(same)	IPCBuffer[5]
EBP	(same)	IPCBuffer[6]
EIP	(same)	IPCBuffer[7]
ESP	(same)	IPCBuffer[8]
EFLAGS	(same)	IPCBuffer[9]
Syscall number	<u> </u>	IPCBuffer[10]

Table 6.3	Unknown system	call outcome on	the IA-32 architecture.
-----------	----------------	-----------------	-------------------------

#### **IA-32**

### 6.2.3 User Exception

User exceptions are used to deliver architecture-defined exceptions. For example, such an exception could occur if a user thread attempted to divide a number by zero.

Replying to the fault IPC allows the thread to be restarted and/or the thread's register set to be modified. If the reply has a label of zero, the thread will be restarted. Additionally, if the message length is non-zero, the faulting thread's register set will be updated as shown in Table 6.4 and Table 6.5. In this case, the number of registers updated is controlled with the length field of the message tag.

#### $\mathbf{ARM}$

Value sent	Register set by reply	IPC buffer location
FaultInstruction	(same)	IPCBuffer[0]
SP	(same)	IPCBuffer[1]
CPSR	(same)	IPCBuffer[2]
Exception number		IPCBuffer[3]
Exception code	—	IPCBuffer[4]

 Table 6.4:
 User exception outcome on the ARM architecture.

#### **IA-32**

#### 6.2.4 VM Fault

The thread caused a page fault. Replying to the fault IPC will restart the thread. The contents of the IPC message are given below.

Value sent	Register set by reply	IPC buffer location
EIP	(same)	IPCBuffer[0]
ESP	(same)	IPCBuffer[1]
EFLAGS	(same)	IPCBuffer[2]
Exception number		IPCBuffer[3]
Exception code		IPCBuffer[4]

 Table 6.5:
 User exception outcome on the IA-32 architecture.

Meaning	IPC buffer location
Program counter to restart execution at. Address that caused the fault. Instruction fault (1 if the fault was caused by an instruction fetch).	IPCBuffer[0] IPCBuffer[1] IPCBuffer[2]
Fault status register (FSR). Contains in- formation about the cause of the fault. Architecture dependent.	IPCBuffer[3]

# 6.3 Domains

Domains are used to isolate independent subsystems, so as to limit information flow between them. The kernel switches between domains according to a fixed, time-triggered schedule. The fixed schedule is compiled into the kernel via the constant CONFIG\_-NUM\_DOMAINS and the global variable ksDomSchedule.

A thread belongs to exactly one domain, and will only run when that domain is active. The seL4\_DomainSet\_Set() method changes the domain of a thread. The caller must possess a Domain cap and the thread's TCB cap. The initial thread starts with a Domain cap (see Section 4.1).

# Chapter 7

# Address Spaces and Virtual Memory

A virtual address space in seL4 is called a VSpace. In a similar way to a CSpace (see Chapter 3), a VSpace is composed of objects provided by the microkernel. Unlike CSpaces, these objects for managing virtual memory largely correspond to those of the hardware; that is, a page directory pointing to page tables, which in turn map physical frames. The kernel also includes ASID Pool and ASID Control objects for tracking the status of address spaces.

These VSpace-related objects are sufficient to implement the hardware data structures required to create, manipulate, and destroy virtual memory address spaces. It should be noted that, as usual, the manipulator of a virtual memory space needs the appropriate capabilities to the required objects.

# 7.1 Overview

**IA-32** IA-32 processors have a two-level page-table structure. The top-level page directory covers a 4 GiB range and each page table covers a 4 MiB range. Frames can be 4 KiB or 4 MiB. Before a 4 KiB frame can be mapped, a page table covering the range that the frame will be mapped into must have been mapped, otherwise seL4 will return an error. 4 MiB frames are mapped directly into the page directory, thus, a page table does not need to be mapped first.

**ARM** ARM processors also have a two-level page-table structure. The top-level page directory covers a range of 4 GiB and each page table covers a 1 MiB range. Four page sizes are allowed: 4 KiB, 64 KiB, 1 MiB and 16 MiB. 4 KiB and 64 KiB pages are mapped into the second-level page table. Before they can be mapped, a page table covering the range that they will be mapped into must have been installed. 1 MiB and 16 MiB pages are installed directly into the page directory such that it is not necessary to map a page table first. Pages of 4 KiB and 1 MiB size occupy one slot in a page table and the page directory, respectively. Pages of 64 KiB and 16 MiB size occupy 16 slots in a page table and the page directory, respectively.

# 7.2 Objects

**Page Directory** The Page Directory (PD) is the top-level page table of the two-level page table structure. It has a hardware-defined format, but conceptually contains a number of page directory entries (PDEs). The Page Directory has no methods itself, but it is used as an argument to several other virtual-memory related object invocations.

**Page Table** The Page Table (PT) object forms the second level of the page-table structure. It contains a number of slots, each of which contains a page-table entry (PTE).

Page Table objects possess only two methods:

```
seL4_ARM_PageTable_Map()
seL4_IA32_PageTable_Map()
```

Takes a Page Directory capability as an argument, and installs a reference to the invoked Page Table in a specified slot in the Page Directory.

```
seL4_ARM_PageTable_Unmap()
seL4_IA32_PageTable_Unmap()
```

Removes the reference to the invoked Page Table from its containing Page Directory.

**Page** A Page object is a region of physical memory that is used to implement virtual memory pages in a virtual address space. The Page object has the following methods:

```
seL4_ARM_Page_Map()
seL4_IA32_Page_Map()
```

Takes a Page Directory capability as an argument and installs a reference to the given Page in the PD or PT slot corresponding to the given address.

```
seL4_ARM_Page_Remap()
seL4_IA32_Page_Remap()
```

Changes the permissions of an existing mapping.

```
seL4_ARM_Page_Unmap()
seL4_IA32_Page_Unmap()
```

Removes an existing mapping.

The virtual address for a Page mapping must be aligned to the size of the Page and must be mapped to a suitable Page Directory or Page Table. To map a page readable, the capability to the page that is being invoked must have read permissions. To map the page writable, the capability must have write permissions. The requested mapping permissions are specified with an argument of type seL4\_CapRights given to the seL4\_ARM\_Page\_Map() or seL4\_IA32\_Page\_Map() method. seL4\_CanRead and seL4\_CanWrite are the only valid permissions on both ARM and IA-32 architectures. If the capability does not have sufficient permissions to authorise the given mapping, then the mapping permissions are silently downgraded.

**ASID Control** For internal kernel book-keeping purposes, there is a fixed maximum number of applications the system can support. In order to manage this limited resource, the microkernel provides an ASID Control capability. The ASID Control capability is used to generate a capability that authorises the use of a subset of available address-space identifiers. This newly created capability is called an ASID Pool. ASID Control only has a single method:

seL4\_ARM\_ASIDControl\_MakePool()
seL4\_IA32\_ASIDControl\_MakePool()

Together with a capability to Untyped Memory as argument creates an ASID Pool.

The untyped capability given to the seL4\_ARM\_ASIDControl\_MakePool() call must represent a 4K memory object. This will create an ASID pool with enough space for 1024 VSpaces.

**ASID Pool** An ASID Pool confers the right to create a subset of the available maximum applications. For a VSpace to be usable by an application, it must be assigned to an ASID. This is done using a capability to an ASID Pool. The ASID Pool object has a single method:

```
seL4_ARM_ASIDPool_Assign()
seL4_IA32_ASIDPool_Assign()
```

Assigns an ASID to the VSpace associated with the Page Directory passed in as an argument.

# 7.3 Mapping Attributes

A parameter of type seL4\_ARM\_VMAttributes or seL4\_IA32\_VMAttributes is used to specify the cache behaviour of the page being mapped; possible values for ARM are shown in Table 7.1 and values for IA-32 are shown in Table 7.2.

Attribute	Meaning
seL4_ARM_PageCacheable	Enable data in this mapping to be cached
seL4_ARM_ParityEnabled	Enable parity checking for this mapping
seL4_ARM_ExecuteNever	Map this memory as non-executable

 Table 7.1:
 Virtual memory attributes for ARM page table entries.

Attribute	Meaning
seL4_IA32_CacheDisabled seL4_IA32_WriteThrough	Prevent data in this mapping from being cached Enable write through cacheing for this mapping
$seL4_IA32_WriteCombining$	Enable write combining for this mapping

Table 7.2: Virtual memory attributes for IA32 page table entries.

# 7.4 Sharing Memory

seL4 does not allow Page Tables to be shared, but does allow pages to be shared between address spaces. To share a page, the capability to the Page must first be duplicated using the seL4\_CNode\_Copy() method and the new copy must be used in the seL4\_-ARM\_Page\_Map() or seL4\_IA32\_Page\_Map() method that maps the page into the second address space. Attempting to map the same capability twice will result in an error.

# 7.5 Page Faults

Page faults are reported to the exception handler of the executed thread. See Section 6.2.4.

# Chapter 8

# Hardware I/O

# 8.1 Interrupt Delivery

Interrupts are delivered as notifications. A thread may configure the kernel to signal a particular Notification object each time a certain interrupt triggers. Threads may then wait for interrupts to occur by calling  $sel4_Wait()$  or  $sel4_Pol1()$  on that Notification. In the notification word returned from either call, bit n (modulo word size) represents IRQ n, the bit will be set if the corresponding IRQ was raised. This supports the use of a single handler for multiple IRQs.

**IRQHandler** capabilities represent the ability of a thread to configure a certain interrupt. They have three methods:

- seL4\_IRQHandler\_SetNotification() specifies the Notification the kernel should signal() when an interrupt occurs. A driver may then call seL4\_Wait() or seL4\_-Poll() on this notification to wait for interrupts to arrive.
- seL4\_IRQHandler\_Ack() informs the kernel that the userspace driver has finished processing the interrupt and the microkernel can send further pending or new interrupts to the application.

seL4\_IRQHandler\_Clear() de-registers the Notification from the IRQHandler object.

When the system first starts, no IRQHandler capabilities are present. Instead, the initial thread's CSpace contains a single IRQControl capability. This capability may be used to produce a single IRQHandler capability for each interrupt available in the system. Typically, the initial thread of a system will determine which IRQs are required by other components in the system, produce an IRQHandler capability for each interrupt, and then delegate the resulting capabilities as appropriate. IRQControl has one method:

seL4\_IRQControl\_Get() creates an IRQHandler capability for the specified interrupt
source.

## 8.2 IA-32-Specific I/O

#### 8.2.1 I/O Ports

On IA-32 platforms, seL4 provides access to I/O ports to user-level threads. Access to I/O ports is controlled by IO Port capabilities. Each IO Port capability identifies a range of ports that can be accessed with it. Reading from I/O ports is accomplished with the seL4\_IA32\_IOPort\_In8(), seL4\_IA32\_IOPort\_In16(), and seL4\_IA32\_IOPort\_In32() methods, which allow for reading of 8-, 16- and 32-bit quantities. Similarly, writing to I/O ports is accomplished with the seL4\_IA32\_IOPort\_Out8(), seL4\_IA32\_IOPort\_-Out16(), and seL4\_IA32\_IOPort\_Out32() methods. Each of these methods takes as arguments an IO Port capability and an unsigned integer port, which indicates the I/O port to read from or write to, respectively. In each case, port must be within the range of I/O ports identified by the given IO Port capability in order for the method to succeed.

At system initialisation, the initial thread's CSpace contains the master IO Port capability, which allows access to all I/O ports. Other IO Port capabilities, which authorise access to a specific range of I/O Ports, may be derived from this master capability using the seL4\_CNode\_Mint() method. The range of I/O ports that the newly created capability should identify are specified via the 32-bit badge argument provided to seL4\_CNode\_Mint(). The first port number in the range occupies the top 16 bits of badge, while the last port number in the range occupies the bottom 16 bits. The range is interpreted as being inclusive of these two numbers.

The I/O port methods return error codes upon failure. A seL4\_IllegalOperation code is returned if port access is attempted outside the range allowed by the IO Port capability. Since invocations that read from I/O ports are required to return two values – the value read and the error code – a structure containing two members, result and error, is returned from these API calls.

## 8.2.2 I/O Space

I/O devices capable of DMA present a security risk because the CPU's MMU is bypassed when the device accesses memory. In seL4, device drivers run in user space to keep them out of the trusted computing base. A malicious or buggy device driver may, however, program the device to access or corrupt memory that is not part of its address space, thus subverting security. To mitigate this threat, seL4 provides support for the IOMMU on Intel IA-32-based platforms. An IOMMU allows memory to be remapped from the device's point of view. It acts as an MMU for the device, restricting the regions of system memory that it can access. More information can be obtained from Intel's IOMMU documentation [Int11].

seL4-based systems that wish to utilise DMA must have an IOMMU. This restriction results from the fact that seL4 provides no way to obtain the physical address of a Page from its capability. Hence, applications are unable to accurately instruct devices, at which address they should directly address the physical memory. Instead, frames of memory must be mapped into the device's address space using seL4's IOMMU primitives. Two new objects are provided by the kernel to abstract the IOMMU:

- **IOSpace** This object represents the address space associated with a hardware device on the PCI bus. It represents the right to modify a device's memory mappings.
- **IOPageTable** This object represents a node in the multilevel page-table structure used by IOMMU hardware to translate hardware memory accesses.

Page capabilities are used to represent the actual frames that are mapped into the I/O address space. A Page can be mapped into either a VSpace or an IOSpace but never into both at the same time.

IOSpace and VSpace fault handling differ significantly. VSpace page faults are redirected to the thread's exception handler (see Section 6.2), which can take the appropriate action and restart the thread at the faulting instruction. There is no concept of an exception handler for an IOSpace. Instead, faulting transactions are simply aborted; the device driver must correct the cause of the fault and retry the DMA transaction.

An initial master IOSpace capability is provided in the initial thread's CSpace. An IOSpace capability for a specific device is created by using the seL4\_CNode\_Mint() method, passing the PCI identifier of the device as the low 16 bits of the badge argument, and a Domain ID as the high 16 bits of the badge argument. PCI identifiers are explained fully in the PCI specification [SA99], but are briefly described here. A PCI identifier is a 16-bit quantity. The first 8 bits identify the bus that the device is on. The next 5 bits are the device identifier: the number of the device on the bus. The last 3 bits are the function number. A single device may consist of several independent functions, each of which may be addressed by the PCI identifier. Domain IDs are explained fully in the Intel IOMMU documentation [Int11]. There is presently no way to query seL4 for how many Domain IDs are supported by the IOMMU and the seL4\_CNode\_Mint() method will fail if an unsupported value is chosen.

The IOMMU page-table structure has three levels. Page tables are mapped into an IOSpace using the seL4\_IA32\_IOPageTable\_Map() method. This method takes the IOPageTable to map, the IOSpace to map into and the address to map at. Three levels of page tables must be mapped before a frame can be mapped successfully. A frame is mapped with the seL4\_IA32\_Page\_MapIO() method whose parameters are analogous to the corresponding method that maps Pages into VSpaces (see Chapter 7), namely seL4\_IA32\_Page\_Map().

Unmapping is accomplished with the usual unmap (see Chapter 7) API call, seL4\_-IA32\_Page\_Unmap().

More information about seL4's IOMMU abstractions can be found in [Pal09].

# Chapter 9

# System Bootstrapping

## 9.1 Initial Thread's Environment

The seL4 kernel creates a minimal boot environment for the initial thread. This environment consists of the initial thread's TCB, CSpace and VSpace, consisting of frames that contain the userland image (code/data of the initial thread) and the IPC buffer. The initial thread's CSpace consists of exactly one CNode which contains capabilities to the initial thread's own resources was well as to all available global resources. The CNode size can be configured at compile time (default is 2<sup>12</sup> slots), but the guard is always chosen so that the CNode resolves exactly 32 bits. This means, the first slot of the CNode has CPTR 0x0, the second slot has CPTR 0x1 etc.

The first 12 slots contain specific capabilities as listed in Table 9.1.

CPTR	Enum Constant	Capability
0x0	seL4_CapNull	null
0x1	$seL4\_CapInitThreadTCB$	initial thread's TCB
0x2	$seL4\_CapInitThreadCNode$	initial thread's CNode
0x3	$\texttt{seL4}_\texttt{CapInitThreadPD}$	initial thread's page directory
0x4	$seL4\_CapIRQControl$	global IRQ controller (see Section $8.1$ )
0x5	$seL4\_CapASIDControl$	global ASID controller (see Chapter 7)
0x6	$\texttt{seL4}_\texttt{CapInitThreadASIDPool}$	initial thread's ASID pool (see Chap-
		ter 7)
0x7	seL4_CapIOPort	global I/O port cap, null cap if unsup-
		ported (see Section $8.2.1$ )
0x8	seL4_CapIOSpace	global I/O space cap, null cap if unsup-
		ported (see Section $8.2.2$ )
0x9	$\texttt{seL4}_\texttt{CapBootInfoFrame}$	BootInfo frame (see Section $9.2$ )
0xa	${\tt seL4\_CapInitThreadIPCBuffer}$	initial thread's IPC buffer (see Sec-
		tion $4.1$ )
0xb	$seL4\_CapDomain$	domain cap (see Section $6.3$ )

 Table 9.1: Initial thread's CNode content.

# 9.2 BootInfo Frame

CNode slots with CPTR 0xb and above are filled dynamically during bootstrapping. Their exact contents depend on the userland image size, platform configuration (devices) etc. In order to tell the initial thread which capabilities are stored where in its CNode, the kernel provides a *BootInfo Frame* which is mapped into the initial thread's address space. The mapped address is chosen by the kernel and given to the initial thread via a CPU register. The initial thread can access this address through the function seL4\_GetBootInfo().

The BootInfo Frame contains the C struct described in Table 9.2. It is defined in the seL4 userland library. Besides talking about capabilities, it also informs the initial thread about the current platform's configuration.

The type seL4\_SlotRegion is a C struct which contains start and end slot CPTRs. It denotes a region of slots in the initial thread's CNode, starting with CPTR start and with end being the CPTR of the first slot after the region ends, i.e. end - 1 points to the last slot of the region.

The capabilities in userImageFrames and userImagePTs are ordered, i.e. the first capability references the first frame of the userland image etc. Userland always knows to which virtual addresses its own code and data is mapped (e.g. in GCC, with the standard linker script, the symbols \_\_executable\_start and \_end are available). Userland can therefore infer the virtual address behind each userland frame and page-table cap.

Untyped memory is given in no particular order. The array entry untypedSizeBitsList[i] stores the untyped-memory size  $(2^n \text{ bytes})$  of the i-th untyped cap of the slot region untyped. Therefore, the array length is at least untyped.end – untyped.start. The actual length is hardcoded in the kernel and irrelevant to the reader of the array. The same is true for the array untypedPaddrList. For each untypedmemory capability, it stores the physical addresses backing the untyped memory. This allows userland to infer physical memory addresses of retyped frames and use them to initiate DMA transfers when no IOMMU is available. The kernel makes no guarantees about certain sizes of untyped memory being available except that it provides a compile-time-configurable minimum number of 4K untyped capabilities (default is 12).

The kernel creates frames covering each physical memory region associated with a memory-mapped device. These device regions are either hardcoded (e.g. on embedded platforms) or discovered at boot time by the kernel through a PCI bus scan. The physical base address of each region is stored in **basePaddr**. The slot region frames identifies all frame caps used to back this region. They are ordered, so the first frame of the region is referenced by the first cap in this slot region and is backed by the physical address **basePaddr**. All frames have the same size:  $2^{frameSizeBits}$  bytes. Hence, the size of the whole region is: (frames.end - frames.start) << frameSizeBits

The array deviceRegions of the BootInfo struct stores all available device regions (i.e. their structs). There are numDeviceRegions of them available in the array.

If the platform has an seL4-supported IOMMU, numIOPTLevels contains the number of IOMMU-page-table levels. This information is needed by userland when constructing an IOMMU address space (IOSpace). If there is no IOMMU support, numIOPTLevels

Field Type	Field Name	Description
sel.4 Word	nodeID	*
0011=001 u		node ID (see Section 9.4)
seL4_Word	numNodes	number of nodes (see Sec-
		tion $9.4$ )
seL4_Word	numIOPTLevels	number of I/O page-table
		levels (0 if no IOMMU)
$seL4_IPCBuffer*$	ipcBuffer	pointer to the initial
		thread's IPC buffer
$\texttt{seL4}\_\texttt{SlotRegion}$	empty	empty slots (null caps)
$\texttt{seL4}\_\texttt{SlotRegion}$	sharedFrames	see Section 9.4
$seL4\_SlotRegion$	userImageFrames	frames containing the user-
		land image
$\texttt{seL4}_\texttt{SlotRegion}$	userImagePTs	page tables covering the
		userland image
$\texttt{seL4}_\texttt{SlotRegion}$	untyped	untyped-memory capabili-
-		ties
seL4_Word[]	untypedPaddrList	array of untyped-memory
		physical addresses
uint8_t[]	untypedSizeBitsList	array of untyped-memory
	51	sizes $(2^n \text{ bytes})$
uint8_t	initThreadCNodeSizeBits	CNode size $(2^n \text{ slots})$
seL4_Word	numDeviceRegions	number of device memory
		regions
seL4_DeviceRegion[]	deviceRegions	device memory regions (see
2021200110010051011[]	act 100100510110	Table 9.3)
uint32 t	initThreadDomain	domain of the initial thread
u111602_6		(see Section 6.3)

Table 9.2: BootInfo struct.

is 0.

## 9.3 Boot Command-line Arguments

On IA-32, seL4 accepts boot command-line arguments which are passed to the kernel via a multiboot-compliant bootloader (e.g. GRUB, syslinux). Multiple arguments are separated from each other by whitespace. Two forms of arguments are accepted: (1) key-value arguments of the form "key=value" and (2) single keys of the form "key". The value field of the key-value form may be a string, a decimal integer, a hexadecimal integer beginning with "0x", or an integer list where list elements are separated by commas. Keys and values can't have any whitespace in them and there can be no whitespace before or after an "=" or a comma either. Arguments are listed in Table 9.4 along with their default values (if left unspecified).

Field Type	Field Name	Description
seL4_Word	basePaddr	physical base address of the device region
seL4_Word	frameSizeBits	size $(2^n$ bytes) of the frames used
seL4_SlotRegion	frames	capabilities to the frames covering the region

Table 9.3:DeviceRegion struct.

Key	Value	Default
console_port	I/O-port base of the serial port that the kernel prints to (if com- piled in debug mode)	0x3f8
debug_port	I/O-port base of the serial port that is used for kernel de- bugging (if compiled in debug mode)	0x3f8
disable_iommu	none	The IOMMU is enabled by default on VT-d-capable plat- forms
max_num_nodes	Maximum number of seL4 nodes that can be started up (see Section 9.4)	1
num_sh_frames	Number of frames shared be- tween seL4 nodes (see Sec- tion 9.4)	0

Table 9.4:IA-32 boot command-line arguments.

# 9.4 Multikernel Bootstrapping

On ARM, seL4 is uniprocessor only and does not support multikernel [BBD<sup>+</sup>09] bootstrapping. Therefore, the field nodeID of the BootInfo struct will always be 0, numNodes will be 1 and sharedFrames will be an empty region.

On IA-32, seL4 can be bootstrapped as a multikernel by setting the boot command-line argument max\_num\_nodes to a value >1. Each available CPU core will then run one isolated *node* of seL4, up to the maximum number specified. The available physical memory is partitioned equally between nodes. All device frames are given to all nodes. The nodes' initial threads have to coordinate access to these device frames, e.g. by defining which node is responsible for which device. IOMMU management can only be performed by the first node, the other nodes are not given a global IOSpace capability. There is also a hard upper limit of number of nodes defined at compile time (default is 8, but it can be increased to 256).

Nodes are isolated from each other, except for *shared frames*. When bootstrapping, the kernel creates a number of 4K userland frames which are shared between nodes. This number can be configured via the boot command-line argument num\_sh\_frames. The

shared frames will appear in the CNode of each node's initial thread. They are given to each initial thread in the same order. In the BootInfo struct, the field sharedFrames contains their slot region.

Shared frames can be used by userland to implement shared data structures, message passing and synchronisation mechanisms. Individual frames can, for example, be minted and handed out to subsystems. This allows connecting them across nodes in a fine-grained manner. Each node has a node ID (field nodeID in BootInfo) whereas the number of nodes can be obtained from the field numNodes.

Userland images are given to the kernel by a multiboot-compliant bootloader (e.g. GRUB, syslinux) via *boot modules*. Each boot module contains an ELF file of a userland image. If there is only one userland image, each node will get its own copy of that userland image. If multiple userland images are given, the first node gets the first image, the second node the second image etc. If there are more nodes than images, each remaining node gets a copy of the last image.

If the kernel is compiled in debug mode, each node can be assigned a separate console port and debug port (see Table 9.4) which is done by specifying an array of I/O-port base addresses. For example, console\_port=0x3f8,0x2f8,0x2e8,0x2e8 assigns port 0x3f8 to node 0, port 0x2f8 to node 1, etc. The remaining nodes have no assigned port and produce no console output. The argument debug\_port works in exactly the same way.

Further details can be obtained from [vT10] which mainly talks about the formal aspects of seL4's multikernel version but also contains details about the bootstrapping. More recent additional information can be found in [vT12], which focusses less on the formal side and more on the OS side.

# Chapter 10

# seL4 API Reference

# 10.1 Error Codes

Invoking a capability with invalid parameters will result in an error. seL4 system calls return an error code in the message tag and a short error description in the message registers to aid the programmer in determining the cause of errors.

## 10.1.1 Invalid Argument

A non-capability argument is invalid.

Field	Meaning
Label	seL4_InvalidArgument
IPCBuffer[0]	Invalid argument number

## 10.1.2 Invalid Capability

A capability argument is invalid.

Field	Meaning
Label	seL4_InvalidCapability
IPCBuffer[0]	Invalid capability argument number

## 10.1.3 Illegal Operation

The requested operation is not permitted.

Field	Meaning	
Label	seL4_IllegalOperation	

## 10.1.4 Range Error

Field	Meaning
Label	seL4_RangeError
IPCBuffer[0]	Minimum allowed value
IPCBuffer[1]	Maximum allowed value

An argument is out of the allowed range.

## 10.1.5 Alignment Error

A supplied argument does not meet the alignment requirements.

Field	Meaning
Label	seL4_AlignmentError

## 10.1.6 Failed Lookup

A capability could not be looked up.

Field	Meaning
Label	seL4_FailedLookup
IPCBuffer[0]	1 if the lookup failed for a source capability, 0 otherwise
IPCBuffer[1]	Type of lookup failure
<pre>IPCBuffer[2]</pre>	Lookup failure description as described in Section 3.4

#### 10.1.7 Delete First

A destination slot specified in the syscall arguments is occupied.

Field	Meaning
Label	seL4_DeleteFirst

## 10.1.8 Revoke First

The object currently has other objects derived from it and the requested invocation cannot be performed until either these objects are deleted or the revoke invocation is performed on the capability.

Field	Meaning
Label	seL4_RevokeFirst

## 10.1.9 Not Enough Memory

The Untyped Memory object does not have enough unallocated space to complete the seL4\_Untyped\_Retype() request.

Field	Meaning
Label	seL4_NotEnoughMemory
IPCBuffer[0]	Amount of memory available in bytes

## 10.2 System Calls

## 10.2.1 Send

static inline void seL4\_Send

Send to a capability

Туре	Name	Description
seL4_CPtr	dest	The capability to be invoked.
seL4_MessageInfo_t	msgInfo	The message info structure for the IPC.

Return value: This method does not return anything.

Description: See Section 2.2

## 10.2.2 Recv

static inline seL4\_MessageInfo\_t seL4\_Recv

Block until a message is received on an endpoint

Type	Name	Description
seL4_CPtr seL4_Word*	src sender	The capability to be invoked. The address to write sender information to. The sender information is the badge of the endpoint capability that was invoked by the sender, or the notification word of the notification object that was signalled. This param- eter is ignored if NULL.

Return value: A seL4\_MessageInfo\_t structure as described in Section 4.1.

## 10.2.3 Call

#### static inline seL4\_MessageInfo\_t seL4\_Call

Call a capability

Туре	Name	Description
seL4_CPtr	dest	The capability to be invoked.
seL4_MessageInfo_t	msgInfo	The message info structure for the IPC.

Return value: A seL4\_MessageInfo\_t structure as described in Section 4.1. Description: See Section 2.2

#### 10.2.4 Reply

#### static inline void seL4\_Reply

Perform a send to a one-off reply capability stored when the thread was last called

Туре	Name	Description
seL4_MessageInfo_t	msgInfo	The message info structure for the IPC.

Return value: This method does not return anything.

Description: See Section 2.2

## 10.2.5 Polling Send

static inline void seL4\_NBSend

Perform a polling send to a capability

Type	Name	Description
$seL4_CPtr$	dest	The capability to be invoked.
$seL4_MessageInfo_t$	msgInfo	The message info structure for the IPC.

Return value: This method does not return anything.

## 10.2.6 Reply Recv

#### static inline seL4\_MessageInfo\_t seL4\_ReplyRecv

Perform a reply followed by a recv in one system call

Туре	Name	Description
seL4_CPtr seL4_MessageInfo_t seL4_Word*	dest msgInfo sender	The capability to be invoked. The message info structure for the IPC. The address to write sender information to. The sender information is the badge of the endpoint capability that was invoked by the sender, or the notification word of the noti- fication object that was signalled. This pa- rameter is ignored if NULL.

Return value: A seL4\_MessageInfo\_t structure as described in Section 4.1.

Description: See Section 2.2

## 10.2.7 NBRecv

static inline seL4\_MessageInfo\_t seL4\_NBRecv

Recieve a message from an endpoint but do not block in the case that no messages are pending

Type	Name	Description
seL4_CPtr seL4_Word*	src sender	The capability to be invoked. The address to write sender information to. The sender information is the badge of the endpoint capability that was invoked by the sender, or the notification word of the notification object that was signalled. This param- eter is ignored if NULL.

Return value: A seL4\_MessageInfo\_t structure as described in Section 4.1.

## 10.2.8 Yield

#### static inline void seL4\_Yield

Donate the remaining timeslice to a thread of the same priority

Type	Name	Description	
void			

Return value: This method does not return anything. Description: See Section 2.2

## 10.2.9 Signal

static inline void seL4\_Signal

Signal a notification

Type	Name	Description
seL4_CPtr	dest	The capability to be invoked.

Return value: This method does not return anything.

*Description:* This is not a proper system call known by the kernel. Rather, it is a convenience wrapper provided by the seL4 userland library which calls seL4\_Send(). It is useful for signalling a notification.

See the description of seL4\_Send() in Section 2.2

## 10.2.10 Wait

#### static inline void seL4\_Wait

Perform a receive on a notification object.

Type	Name	Description
seL4_CPtr seL4_Word*	src sender	The capability to be invoked. The address to write sender information to. The sender information is the badge of the endpoint capability that was invoked by the sender, or the notification word of the notification object that was signalled. This param- eter is ignored if NULL.

Return value: This method does not return anything.

*Description:* This is not a proper system call known by the kernel. Rather, it is a convenience wrapper provided by the seL4 userland library which calls seL4\_Recv().

See the description of sel4-Recv() in Section 2.2

## 10.2.11 Poll

#### static inline void seL4\_Poll

Perform a non-blocking recv on a notification object.

Type	Name	Description
seL4_CPtr seL4_Word*	src sender	The capability to be invoked. The address to write sender information to. The sender information is the badge of the endpoint capability that was invoked by the sender, or the notification word of the notification object that was signalled. This param-
		eter is ignored if NULL.

Return value: This method does not return anything.

*Description:* This is not a proper system call known by the kernel. Rather, it is a convenience wrapper provided by the seL4 userland library which calls seL4\_NBRecv(). It is useful for doing a non-blocking wait on a notification.

See the description of seL4\_NBRecv() in Section 2.2

# 10.3 Architecture-Independent Object Methods

## 10.3.1 CNode - Copy

#### static inline int seL4\_CNode\_Copy

Copy a capability, setting its access rights whilst doing so

Туре	Name	Description	
$seL4_CNode$	_service	CPTR to the CNode that forms the root of	
		the destination CSpace. Must be at a depth	
		of 32.	
seL4_Word	$dest_index$	CPTR to the destination slot. Resolved from	
		the root of the destination CSpace.	
uint8_t	dest_depth Number of bits of dest_index to resolve to find		
		the destination slot.	
$seL4_CNode$	src_root	src_root CPTR to the CNode that forms the root of	
		the source CSpace. Must be at a depth of 32.	
seL4_Word	$\texttt{src}_{index}$	CPTR to the source slot. Resolved from the	
		root of the source CSpace.	
uint8_t	src_depth Number of bits of src_index to resolve to find		
		the source slot.	
seL4_CapRights	rights	The rights inherited by the new capability.	
		Possible values for this type are given in Sec-	
		tion 3.1.3.	

*Return value:* A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 10.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

## 10.3.2 CNode - Delete

static inline int seL4\_CNode\_Delete

Delete a capability

Type	Name	Description
seL4_CNode	_service	CPTR to the CNode at the root of the CSpace where the capability will be found. Must be at a depth of 32.
seL4_Word	index	CPTR to the capability. Resolved from the root of the _service parameter.
uint8_t	depth	Number of bits of index to resolve to find the capa- bility being operated on.

*Return value:* A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 10.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

## 10.3.3 CNode - Mint

#### static inline int seL4\_CNode\_Mint

Copy a capability, setting its access rights and badge whilst doing so

Туре	Name	Description	
seL4_CNode	_service	CPTR to the CNode that forms the root of the destination CSpace. Must be at a depth of 32.	
seL4_Word	$dest_index$	CPTR to the destination slot. Resolved from the root of the destination CSpace.	
uint8_t	$dest_depth$	Number of bits of dest_index to resolve to find the destination slot.	
seL4_CNode	src_root	CPTR to the CNode that forms the root of the source CSpace. Must be at a depth of 32.	
seL4_Word	$\texttt{src}_{index}$	CPTR to the source slot. Resolved from the root of the source CSpace.	
uint8_t	$\texttt{src}_\texttt{depth}$	Number of bits of src_index to resolve to find the source slot.	
seL4_CapRights	rights	The rights inherited by the new capability. Possible values for this type are given in Sec- tion 3.1.3.	
seL4_CapData_t	badge	Badge to be applied to the new capability.	

*Return value:* A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 10.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

## 10.3.4 CNode - Move

static inline int seL4\_CNode\_Move

Move a capability

Type	Name	Description
seL4_CNode	_service	CPTR to the CNode that forms the root of the
		destination CSpace. Must be at a depth of 32.
seL4_Word	$\texttt{dest}_{index}$	CPTR to the destination slot. Resolved from the
		root of the destination CSpace.
$uint8_t$	$\texttt{dest}_\texttt{depth}$	Number of bits of dest_index to resolve to find the
		destination slot.
$seL4_CNode$	src_root	CPTR to the CNode that forms the root of the
		source CSpace. Must be at a depth of 32.
$seL4_Word$	$\texttt{src}_{index}$	CPTR to the source slot. Resolved from the root
		of the source CSpace.
$uint8_t$	$\texttt{src}_\texttt{depth}$	Number of bits of src_index to resolve to find the
	_	source slot.

*Return value:* A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 10.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

## 10.3.5 CNode - Mutate

#### static inline int seL4\_CNode\_Mutate

Move a capability, setting its badge in the process

Type	Name	Description	
seL4_CNode	_service	CPTR to the CNode that forms the root of the	
seL4_Word	dest_index	destination CSpace. Must be at a depth of 32. <b>st_index</b> CPTR to the destination slot. Resolved from the root of the destination CSpace.	
uint8_t	dest_depth	Number of bits of dest_index to resolve to find the destination slot.	
$seL4_CNode$	${\tt src\_root}$		
$seL4_Word$	$\texttt{src}_{index}$	CPTR to the source slot. Resolved from the	
uint8_t	$\texttt{src\_depth}$	root of the source CSpace. Number of bits of src_index to resolve to find the source slot.	
seL4_CapData_t	badge	Badge to be applied to the new capability.	

*Return value:* A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 10.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

## 10.3.6 CNode - Recycle

#### static inline int seL4\_CNode\_Recycle

The recycle method is intended roughly as a shortcut for reusing an object within the same protection domain. The method will first revoke the capability and will then reset some but not necessarily all aspects of an object to its neutral state. Recycling badged endpoint caps will only cancel IPCs for this badge. Recycled frames, page tables and directories should only be re-used in the same protection domain, not all authority to them is rescinded. For full reuse in a different protection domain, revoke and retype the untyped cap that was used to create the object. For the precise behaviour of recycle, see the formal specification.

Type	Name	Description
seL4_CNode	_service	CPTR to the CNode at the root of the CSpace where the capability will be found. Must be at a depth of 32.
seL4_Word	index	CPTR to the capability. Resolved from the root of the _service parameter.
uint8_t	depth	Number of bits of index to resolve to find the capa- bility being operated on.

*Return value:* A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 10.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

## 10.3.7 CNode - Revoke

#### static inline int seL4\_CNode\_Revoke

Delete all child capabilities of a capability

Type	Name	Description
seL4_CNode	_service	CPTR to the CNode at the root of the CSpace where the capability will be found. Must be at a depth of 32.
seL4_Word	index	CPTR to the capability. Resolved from the root of the _service parameter.
uint8_t	depth	Number of bits of index to resolve to find the capa- bility being operated on.

*Return value:* A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 10.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

## 10.3.8 CNode - Rotate

#### static inline int seL4\_CNode\_Rotate

Given 3 capability slots - a destination, pivot and source - move the capability in the pivot slot to the destination slot and the capability in the source slot to the pivot slot

Туре	Name	Description
seL4_CNode	_service	CPTR to the CNode at the root of the
		CSpace where the destination slot will be
		found. Must be at a depth of 32.
seL4_Word	$\texttt{dest\_index}$	CPTR to the destination slot. Resolved rel-
		ative to _service. Must be empty unless it
		refers to the same slot as the source slot.
$uint8_t$	$\texttt{dest\_depth}$	Depth to resolve dest_index to.
$seL4_CapData_t$	$dest_badge$	The new capdata for the capability that ends
		up in the destination slot.
seL4_CNode	pivot_root	CPTR to the CNode at the root of the
		CSpace where the pivot slot will be found.
		Must be at a depth of 32.
$seL4_Word$	$\mathtt{pivot}_{-}\mathtt{index}$	CPTR to the pivot slot. Resolved relative to
		pivot_root. The resolved slot must not refer
		to the source or destination slots.
$uint8_t$	$pivot_depth$	Depth to resolve pivot_index to.
$seL4_CapData_t$	pivot_badge	The new capdata for the capability that ends
		up in the pivot slot.
seL4_CNode	src_root	CPTR to the CNode at the root of the
		CSpace where the source slot will be found.
		Must be at a depth of 32.
seL4_Word	$\texttt{src}_{index}$	CPTR to the source slot. Resolved relative
		to src_root.
uint8_t	$\texttt{src\_depth}$	Depth to resolve src_index to.

*Return value:* A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 10.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

#### 10.3.9 CNode - Save Caller

#### static inline int seL4\_CNode\_SaveCaller

Save the reply capability from the last time the thread was called in the given CSpace so that it can be invoked later

Type	Name	Description
seL4_CNode	_service	CPTR to the CNode at the root of the CSpace where the capability is to be saved. Must be at a depth of 32.
seL4_Word	index	CPTR to the slot in which to save the capability. Resolved from the root of the _service parameter.
$uint8_t$	depth	Number of bits of index to resolve to find the slot being targeted.

*Return value:* A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 10.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

Description: See Section 3.1.2.

## 10.3.10 Debug - Halt

#### static inline void seL4\_DebugHalt

Halt the system

Type	Name	Description	
void			

Return value: This method does not return anything.

Description: Halts the system, if debugging is turned on.

## 10.3.11 Debug - Put Character

#### static inline void seL4\_DebugPutChar

Print a character to the console

Type	Name	Description
char	С	The character to print.

Return value: This method does not return anything.

Description: Prints a character to the serial port, if debugging is turned on.

## 10.3.12 DomainSet - Set

### static inline int seL4\_DomainSet\_Set

Change the domain of a thread.

Туре	Name	Description
seL4_DomainSet	_service	Capability allowing domain configuration.
$uint8_t$	domain	The thread's new domain.
seL4_TCB	thread	Capability to the TCB which is being operated
		on.

*Return value:* A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 10.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

Description: See Section 6.3

## 10.3.13 IRQ Control - Get

#### static inline int seL4\_IRQControl\_Get

Create an IRQ handler capability

Type	Name	Description
$seL4_IRQControl$	_service	An IRQControl capability. This gives you the authority to make this call.
int	irq	The IRQ that you want this capability to han- dle.
seL4_CNode	root	CPTR to the CNode that forms the root of the destination CSpace. Must be at a depth of 32.
seL4_Word	index	CPTR to the destination slot. Resolved from the root of the destination CSpace.
uint8_t	depth	Number of bits of dest_index to resolve to find the destination slot.

*Return value:* A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 10.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

Description: See Section 8.1

## 10.3.14 IRQ Handler - Acknowledge

static inline int seL4\_IRQHandler\_Ack

Acknowledge the receipt of an interrupt and re-enable it

Туре	Name	Description
seL4_IRQHandler	_service	The IRQ handler capability.

*Return value:* A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 10.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

Description: See Section 8.1

## 10.3.15 IRQ Handler - Clear

#### static inline int seL4\_IRQHandler\_Clear

Clear the handler capability from the IRQ slot

Type	Name	Description
$seL4_IRQHandler$	_service	The IRQ handler capability.

*Return value:* A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 10.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

Description: See Section 8.1

## 10.3.16 IRQ Handler - Set Notification

#### static inline int seL4\_IRQHandler\_SetNotification

Set the notification which the kernel will signal on interrupts controlled by the supplied IRQ handler capability

Type	Name	Description
seL4_IRQHandler seL4_CPtr	_service notification	The IRQ handler capability. The notification which will the IRQs will signal.

*Return value:* A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 10.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

Description: See Section 8.1

## 10.3.17 TCB - Bind Notification

#### static inline int seL4\_TCB\_BindNotification

Binds a notification object to a TCB

Type	Name	Description
seL4_TCB	_service	Capability to the TCB which is being operated
		on.
$seL4_CPtr$	notification	Notification to bind.

*Return value:* A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 10.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

Description: See Section 5.3

## 10.3.18 TCB - Unbind Notification

static inline int seL4\_TCB\_UnbindNotification

Unbinds any notification object from a TCB

Type	Name	Description
seL4_TCB	_service	Capability to the TCB which is being operated on.

*Return value:* A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 10.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

Description: See Section 5.3

# 10.3.19 TCB - Configure

#### static inline int seL4\_TCB\_Configure

Set the parameters of a TCB

Type	Name	Description
seL4_TCB	_service	Capability to the TCB which is being
		operated on.
seL4_Word	fault_ep	CPTR to the endpoint which receives
		IPCs when this thread faults. This ca-
		pability is in the CSpace of the thread
		being configured.
$uint8_t$	priority	The thread's new priority.
$seL4_CNode$	cspace_root	The new CSpace root.
seL4_CapData_t	cspace_root_data	Optionally set the guard and guard size
		of the new root CNode. If set to zero,
		this parameter has no effect.
$seL4_CNode$	vspace_root	The new VSpace root.
seL4_CapData_t	vspace_root_data	Has no effect on IA-32 or ARM proces-
		sors.
seL4_Word	buffer	Location of the thread's IPC buffer.
		Must be 512-byte aligned. The IPC
		buffer may not cross a page boundary.
$seL4\_CPtr$	bufferFrame	Capability to a page containing the
		thread's IPC buffer.

*Return value:* A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 10.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

Description: See Section 6.1

## 10.3.20 TCB - Copy Registers

#### static inline int seL4\_TCB\_CopyRegisters

Copy the registers from one thread to another

Type	Name	Description
seL4_TCB	_service	Capability to the TCB which is being operated on. This is the destination TCB.
seL4_TCB	source	Cap to the source TCB.
bool	$suspend_source$	The invocation should also suspend the source
		thread.
bool	$resume_target$	The invocation should also resume the desti-
		nation thread.
bool	$transfer_frame$	Frame registers should be transferred.
bool	$transfer_integer$	Integer registers should be transferred.
uint8_t	$arch_flags$	Architecture dependent flags. These have no
		meaning on either IA-32 or ARM.

*Return value:* A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 10.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

*Description:* In the context of this function, frame registers are those that are read, modified or preserved by a system call and integer registers are those that are not. Refer to the seL4 userland library source for specifics. Section 6.1.2

## 10.3.21 TCB - Read Registers

#### static inline int seL4\_TCB\_ReadRegisters

Read a thread's registers into the first count fields of a given seL4\_UserContext

Type	Name	Description
seL4_TCB	_service	Capability to the TCB which is being operated on.
bool	suspend_source	The invocation should also suspend the source thread.
uint8_t	arch_flags	Architecture dependent flags. These have no meaning on either IA-32 or ARM.
seL4_Word seL4_UserContext*	count regs	The number of registers to read. The structure to read the registers into.

*Return value:* A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 10.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

Description: See Section 6.1.5

## 10.3.22 TCB - Resume

static inline int seL4\_TCB\_Resume

Resume a thread

Type	Name	Description	
seL4_TCB	_service	Capability to the TCB which is being operated on.	

*Return value:* A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 10.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

Description: See Section 6.1

## 10.3.23 TCB - Set IPC Buffer

#### static inline int seL4\_TCB\_SetIPCBuffer

Set a thread's IPC buffer

Type	Name	Description
seL4_TCB	_service	Capability to the TCB which is being operated on.
seL4_Word	buffer	Location of the thread's IPC buffer. Must be 512-
		byte aligned. The IPC buffer may not cross a page
		boundary.
$seL4_CPtr$	bufferFrame	Capability to a page containing the thread's IPC
		buffer.

*Return value:* A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 10.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

Description: See Sections 6.1 and 4.1

#### 10.3.24 TCB - Set Priority

static inline int seL4\_TCB\_SetPriority

Change a thread's priority

Type	Name	Description
		Capability to the TCB which is being operated on. The thread's new priority.

*Return value:* A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 10.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

Description: See Section 6.1.3

## 10.3.25 TCB - Set Space

#### static inline int seL4\_TCB\_SetSpace

Set the fault endpoint, CSpace and VSpace of a thread

Type	Name	Description
seL4_TCB	_service	Capability to the TCB which is being operated on.
seL4_Word	fault_ep	CPTR to the endpoint which receives IPCs when this thread faults. This ca- pability is in the CSpace of the thread being configured.
seL4_CNode	cspace_root	The new CSpace root.
seL4_CapData_t	cspace_root_data	Optionally set the guard and guard size of the new root CNode. If set to zero, this parameter has no effect.
seL4_CNode seL4_CapData_t	vspace_root vspace_root_data	The new VSpace root. Has no effect on IA-32 or ARM processors.

*Return value:* A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 10.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

Description: See Section 6.1

## 10.3.26 TCB - Suspend

static inline int seL4\_TCB\_Suspend

Suspend a thread

Type	Name	Description
seL4_TCB	_service	Capability to the TCB which is being operated on.

*Return value:* A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 10.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

Description: See Section 6.1.2

## 10.3.27 TCB - Write Registers

#### static inline int seL4\_TCB\_WriteRegisters

Set a thread's registers to the first count fields of a given seL4\_UserContext

Туре	Name	Description
seL4_TCB	_service	Capability to the TCB which is being operated on.
bool	$resume_target$	The invocation should also resume the destination thread.
uint8_t	$arch_flags$	Architecture dependent flags. These have no meaning on either IA-32 or ARM.
$seL4_Word$	count	The number of registers to be set.
seL4_UserContext*	regs	Data structure containing the new reg- ister values.

*Return value:* A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 10.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

Description: See Section 6.1.5

## 10.3.28 Untyped - Retype

#### static inline int seL4\_Untyped\_Retype

Retype an untyped object

Type	Name	Description
seL4_Untyped	_service	CPTR to an untyped object.
int	type	The seL4 object type that we are retyping to.
int	size_bits	Only valid for objects with various sizes. Ex-
		plained below.
$seL4_CNode$	root	CPTR to the CNode at the root of the destina-
		tion CSpace.
int	$\texttt{node}_{index}$	CPTR to the destination CNode. Resolved rel-
		ative to the root parameter.
int	$\mathtt{node\_depth}$	Number of bits of node_index to translate when
		addressing the destination CNode.
int	$\texttt{node}_\texttt{offset}$	Number of slots into the node at which capa-
		bilities start being placed.
int	$\texttt{num\_objects}$	Number of capabilities to create.

*Return value:* A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 10.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

*Description:* Given a capability, \_service, to an untyped object, creates num\_objects of the requested type. Creates num\_objects capabilities to the new objects starting at node\_offset in the given CNode.

The retype method can be complex because multiple capabilities may be created and some objects such as CNodes may have varying sizes.

Most kernel objects have a fixed size, and hence no further information must be given to the kernel about them. CNodes and Untyped Memory however have a variable size, and so the user must additionally give a value in the size\_bits parameter to specify the desired size for the objects to be created. For CNodes, the number of slots in each CNode is calculated as  $2^{size\_bits}$  and hence the required amount of memory for each is  $16*2^{size\_bits}$ . For the case where Untyped Memory is being split into smaller blocks of Untyped Memory, the size of each of the resulting Untyped Memory blocks is calculated as  $2^{size\_bits}$ . If the size of the memory area needed (calculated by the object size multiplied by num\_objects) is greater than the remaining unallocated memory of the untyped memory region, an error will result. Otherwise object allocation will proceed.

Allocation is performed by choosing the region of memory closest to the start of the untyped memory object that is both unallocated, and aligned to the size of the type of object(s) being created. This may leave unallocated gaps between objects in the parent untyped object, which are considered as allocated.

The retype method places capabilities to the objects produced at consecutive locations in a CNode. The CNode is specified by the root, node\_index and node\_depth param-

Object	Object Size
<i>n</i> -bit Untyped	$2^n$ bytes (where $n \ge 4$ )
n-slot CNode	16n bytes (where $n \ge 2$ )
Endpoint	16 bytes
Notification	16 bytes
IRQ Control	
IRQ Handler	

Table 10.1: Platform-independent object sizes.

eters (see Section 3.3.2). The node\_offset parameter specifies the index in the CNode at which the first capability will be placed. The num\_objects parameter specifies the number of capabilities (and, hence, objects) to create. All slots must be empty or an error will result. All resulting objects will be placed in the same CNode.

## 10.3.29 Summary of Object Sizes

When retyping untyped memory it is useful to know how much memory the object will require. Object sizes are summarised in Tables 10.1, 10.2 and 10.3.

IA-32 Object	Object Size
Thread Control Block	1KiB
IA32 4K Frame	4KiB
IA32 4M Frame	4MiB
IA32 Page Directory	4KiB
IA32 Page Table	4KiB
IA32 ASID Control	
IA32 ASID Pool	4KiB
IA32 Port	
IA32 IO Space	
IA32 IO Page table	4KiB

ARM Object	Object Size
Thread Control Block	512 bytes
ARM Small Frame	4KiB
ARM Large Frame	64KiB
ARM Section	1MiB
ARM Supersection	16 MiB
ARM Page Directory	16KiB
ARM Page Table	1KiB
ARM ASID Control	
ARM ASID Pool	4KiB

Table 10.2: IA-32-specific object sizes.

Table 10.3:ARM-specific object sizes.

# 10.4 IA-32-Specific Object Methods

## 10.4.1 IA32 ASID Control - Make Pool

static inline int seL4\_IA32\_ASIDControl\_MakePool

Create an IA-32 ASID pool

Туре	Name	Description
seL4_IA32_ASIDControl	_service	The master ASIDControl capability.
$seL4_Untyped$	untyped	Capability to an untyped memory object
		that will become the pool. Must be 4K
seL4 CNode		bytes. CPTR to the CNode that forms the root
SeL4_CNOde	root	of the destination CSpace. Must be at a
		depth of 32.
seL4_Word	index	CPTR to the destination slot. Resolved
		from the root of the destination CSpace.
uint8_t	depth	Number of bits of index to resolve to find
		the destination slot.

*Return value:* A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 10.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

Description: See Chapter 7

## 10.4.2 IA32 ASID Pool - Assign

static inline int seL4\_IA32\_ASIDPool\_Assign

Assign an ASID pool

Туре	Name	Description
seL4_IA32_ASIDPool	_service	The ASID pool which is being as- signed to. Must not be full. Each ASID pool can contain 1024 entries.
seL4_IA32_PageDirectory	vroot	The page directory that is being as- signed to an ASID pool. Must not al- ready be assigned to an ASID pool.

*Return value:* A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 10.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

## 10.4.3 IA32 IO Port - In 8

#### static inline seL4\_IA32\_IOPort\_In8\_t seL4\_IA32\_IOPort\_In8

Read 8 bits from an IO port

Type	Name	Description
	_service port	An IO port capability. The port to read from.

*Return value:* A seL4\_IA32\_IOPort\_In8\_t structure as described in Section 8.2.1 *Description:* See Section 8.2.1

## 10.4.4 IA32 IO Port - In 16

## static inline seL4\_IA32\_IOPort\_In16\_t seL4\_IA32\_IOPort\_In16

Read 16 bits from an IO port

Туре	Name	Description
seL4_IA32_IOPort	_service	An IO port capability.
$uint16_t$	port	The port to read from.

*Return value:* A seL4\_IA32\_IOPort\_In16\_t structure as described in Section 8.2.1 *Description:* See Section 8.2.1

## 10.4.5 IA32 IO Port - In 32

static inline seL4\_IA32\_IOPort\_In32\_t seL4\_IA32\_IOPort\_In32

Read 32 bits from an IO port

Type	Name	Description
seL4_IA32_IOPort	_service	An IO port capability.
uint16_t	port	The port to read from.

Return value: A seL4\_IA32\_IOPort\_In32\_t structure as described in Section 8.2.1 Description: See Section 8.2.1

## 10.4.6 IA32 IO Port - Out 8

#### static inline int seL4\_IA32\_IOPort\_Out8

Write 8 bits to an IO port

Type	Name	Description
seL4_IA32_IOPort	_service	An IO port capability.
$uint16_t$	port	The port to write to.
uint8_t	data	Data to write to the IO port.

*Return value:* A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 10.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

Description: See Section 8.2.1

## 10.4.7 IA32 IO Port - Out 16

static inline int seL4\_IA32\_IOPort\_Out16

Write 16 bits to an IO port

Type	Name	Description
seL4_IA32_IOPort	_service	An IO port capability.
$uint16_t$	port	The port to write to.
uint16_t	data	Data to write to the IO port.

*Return value:* A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 10.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

Description: See Section 8.2.1

## 10.4.8 IA32 IO Port - Out 32

#### static inline int seL4\_IA32\_IOPort\_Out32

Write 32 bits to an IO port

Type	Name	Description
seL4_IA32_IOPort	_service	An IO port capability.
$uint16_t$	port	The port to write to.
uint32_t	data	Data to write to the IO port.

*Return value:* A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 10.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

Description: See Section 8.2.1

## 10.4.9 IA32 IO Page Table - Map

#### static inline int seL4\_IA32\_IOPageTable\_Map

Map a page table into an IOSpace

Туре	Name	Description
seL4_IA32_IOPageTable seL4_IA32_IOSpace	_service iospace	The page table that is being mapped. The IOSpace that the page table is being mapped into.
seL4_Word	ioaddr	The address that the page table is being mapped at.

*Return value:* A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 10.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

Description: See Section 8.2.2

## 10.4.10 IA32 Page - Map IO

#### static inline int seL4\_IA32\_Page\_MapIO

Map a page into an IOSpace

Туре	Name	Description
seL4_IA32_Page seL4_IA32_IOSpace	_service iospace	The frame that is being mapped. The IOSpace that the frame is being mapped into.
$seL4_CapRights$	rights	Rights for the mapping. Possible values for this type are given in Section 3.1.3.
seL4_Word	ioaddr	The address that the frame is being mapped at.

*Return value:* A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 10.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

Description: See Section 8.2.2

## 10.4.11 IA32 Page - Map

static inline int seL4\_IA32\_Page\_Map

Map a page into an address space

Type	Name	Description
seL4_IA32_Page	_service	Capability to the page to map.
$seL4_IA32_PageDirectory$	pd	Capability to the VSpace which will
		contain the mapping.
seL4_Word	vaddr	Virtual address to map the page into.
$seL4\_CapRights$	rights	Rights for the mapping. Possible val-
		ues for this type are given in Sec-
		tion $3.1.3$ .
seL4_IA32_VMAttributes	attr	VM Attributes for the mapping. Pos-
		sible values for this type are given in
		Chapter 7.

*Return value:* A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 10.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

## 10.4.12 IA32 Page - Remap

#### static inline int seL4\_IA32\_Page\_Remap

Remap a page

Туре	Name	Description
seL4_IA32_Page seL4_IA32_PageDirectory	_service pd	Capability to the page to map. Capability to the VSpace which will contain the mapping.
seL4_CapRights	rights	Rights for the mapping. Possible values for this type are given in Section 3.1.3.
seL4_IA32_VMAttributes	attr	VM Attributes for the mapping. Possible values for this type are given in Chapter 7.

*Return value:* A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 10.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

Description: See Chapter 7

## 10.4.13 IA32 Page - Unmap

static inline int seL4\_IA32\_Page\_Unmap

Unmap a page

Туре	Name	Description
seL4_IA32_Page	_service	Capability to the page to unmap.

*Return value:* A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 10.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

## 10.4.14 IA32 Page - Get Address

#### static inline seL4\_IA32\_Page\_GetAddress\_t seL4\_IA32\_Page\_GetAddress

Get the physical address of the underlying frame

Type	Name	Description
seL4_IA32_Page	_service	Capability to the page to lookup.

*Return value:* A seL4\_IA32\_Page\_GetAddress\_t struct that contains seL4\_Word paddr, which holds the physical address of the page, and int error. See Section 10.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

Description: See Chapter 7

## 10.4.15 IA32 Page Table - Map

static inline int seL4\_IA32\_PageTable\_Map

Map a page table into an address space

Туре	Name	Description
seL4_IA32_PageTable seL4_IA32_PageDirectory	_service pd	Capability to the page table to map. Capability to the VSpace which will
seL4_Word seL4_IA32_VMAttributes	vaddr attr	contain the mapping. Virtual address to map the page into. VM Attributes for the mapping. Pos- sible values for this type are given in Chapter 7.

*Return value:* A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 10.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

## 10.4.16 IA32 Page Table - Unmap

#### static inline int seL4\_IA32\_PageTable\_Unmap

Unmap a page table from its address space and zero it out

Туре	Name	Description
seL4_IA32_PageTable	_service	Capability to the page table to unmap.

*Return value:* A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 10.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

# 10.5 ARM-Specific Object Methods

## 10.5.1 ARM ASID Control - Make Pool

static inline int seL4\_ARM\_ASIDControl\_MakePool

Create an ASID Pool

Туре	Name	Description
seL4_ARM_ASIDControl	_service	The master ASIDControl capability.
$seL4\_Untyped$	untyped	Capability to an untyped memory object
		that will become the pool. Must be 4K bytes.
$seL4_CNode$	root	CPTR to the CNode that forms the root
		of the destination CSpace. Must be at a depth of 32.
seL4_Word	index	CPTR to the destination slot. Resolved from the root of the destination CSpace.
uint8_t	depth	Number of bits of index to resolve to find the destination slot.

*Return value:* A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 10.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

Description: See Chapter 7

## 10.5.2 ARM ASID Pool - Assign

#### static inline int seL4\_ARM\_ASIDPool\_Assign

Assign an ASID Pool

Туре	Name	Description
seL4_ARM_ASIDPool	_service	The ASID pool which is being assigned to. Must not be full. Each ASID pool can contain 1024 entries.
seL4_ARM_PageDirectory	vroot	The page directory that is being as- signed to an ASID pool. Must not al- ready be assigned to an ASID pool.

*Return value:* A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 10.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

#### 10.5.3 ARM Page - Clean Data

#### static inline int seL4\_ARM\_Page\_Clean\_Data

Cleans the data cache out to RAM. The start and end are relative to the page being serviced.

Туре	Name	Description
seL4_ARM_Page seL4_Word	_service start_offset	The page whose contents will be flushed. The offset, relative to the start of the page inclusive.
seL4_Word	$end_offset$	The offset, relative to the start of the page exclusive.

*Return value:* A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 10.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

Description: See Chapter 7

## 10.5.4 ARM Page - Invalidate Data

static inline int seL4\_ARM\_Page\_Invalidate\_Data

Invalidates the cache range within the given page. The start and end are relative to the page being serviced and should be aligned to a cache line boundary where possible. An additional clean is performed on the outer cache lines if the start and end are not aligned, to clean out the bytes between the requested and the cache line boundary.

Туре	Name	Description
seL4_ARM_Page seL4_Word	_service start_offset	The page whose contents will be flushed. The offset, relative to the start of the page inclusive.
seL4_Word	$end_offset$	The offset, relative to the start of the page exclusive.

*Return value:* A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 10.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

## 10.5.5 ARM Page - Clean and Invalidate Data

#### static inline int seL4\_ARM\_Page\_CleanInvalidate\_Data

Clean and invalidates the cache range within the given page. The range will be flushed out to RAM. The start and end are relative to the page being serviced.

Туре	Name	Description
seL4_ARM_Page seL4_Word	_service start_offset	The page whose contents will be flushed. The offset, relative to the start of the page inclusive.
seL4_Word	end_offset	The offset, relative to the start of the page exclusive.

*Return value:* A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 10.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

Description: See Chapter 7

## 10.5.6 ARM Page - Unify Instruction Cache

#### static inline int seL4\_ARM\_Page\_Unify\_Instruction

Unify Instruction Cache. Cleans data lines to point of unification, invalidate corresponding instruction lines to point of unification, then invalidates branch predictors. The start and end are relative to the page being serviced.

Туре	Name	Description
seL4_ARM_Page seL4_Word	_service start_offset	The page whose contents will be flushed. The offset, relative to the start of the page inclusive.
seL4_Word	end_offset	The offset, relative to the start of the page exclusive.

*Return value:* A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 10.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

## 10.5.7 ARM Page - Map

#### static inline int seL4\_ARM\_Page\_Map

Map a page into an address space

Туре	Name	Description
seL4_ARM_Page	_service	Capability to the page to map.
seL4_ARM_PageDirectory	pd	Capability to the VSpace which will contain the mapping.
seL4_Word	vaddr	Virtual address to map the page into.
$seL4_CapRights$	rights	Rights for the mapping. Possible values for this type are given in Section 3.1.3.
seL4_ARM_VMAttributes	attr	VM Attributes for the mapping. Pos- sible values for this type are given in Chapter 7.

*Return value:* A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 10.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

Description: See Chapter 7

## 10.5.8 ARM Page - Remap

static inline int seL4\_ARM\_Page\_Remap

Remap a page

Туре	Name	Description
seL4_ARM_Page seL4_ARM_PageDirectory	_service pd	Capability to the page to remap. Capability to the VSpace which will contain the mapping.
$seL4_CapRights$	rights	Rights for the mapping. Possible values for this type are given in Section 3.1.3.
seL4_ARM_VMAttributes	attr	VM Attributes for the mapping. Possible values for this type are given in Chapter 7.

*Return value:* A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 10.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

## 10.5.9 ARM Page - Unmap

#### static inline int seL4\_ARM\_Page\_Unmap

Unmap a page

Туре	Name	Description
seL4_ARM_Page	_service	Capability to the page to unmap.

*Return value:* A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 10.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

Description: See Chapter 7

## 10.5.10 ARM Page - Get Address

static inline seL4\_ARM\_Page\_GetAddress\_t seL4\_ARM\_Page\_GetAddress

Get the physical address of the underlying frame

Type	Name	Description
seL4_ARM_Page	_service	Capability to the page to lookup.

*Return value:* A seL4\_ARM\_Page\_GetAddress\_t struct that contains seL4\_Word paddr, which holds the physical address of the page, and int error. See Section 10.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

## 10.5.11 ARM Page Table - Map

#### static inline int seL4\_ARM\_PageTable\_Map

Map a page table into an address space

Type	Name	Description
seL4_ARM_PageTable	_service	Capability to the page table that will be mapped.
seL4_ARM_PageDirectory	pd	Capability to the VSpace which will contain the mapping.
seL4_Word	vaddr	Virtual address to map the page into.
seL4_ARM_VMAttributes	attr	VM Attributes for the mapping. Possible values for this type are given in Chapter 7.

*Return value:* A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 10.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

Description: See Chapter 7

#### 10.5.12 ARM Page Table - Unmap

#### static inline int seL4\_ARM\_PageTable\_Unmap

Unmap a page table from its address space and zero it out

Туре	Name	Description
seL4_ARM_PageTable	_service	Capability to the page table that will be un- mapped.

*Return value:* A return value of 0 indicates success. A non-zero value indicates that an error occurred. See Section 10.1 for a description of the message register and tag contents upon error.

# Bibliography

- [BBD<sup>+</sup>09] Andrew Baumann, Paul Barham, Pierre-Evariste Dagand, Tim Harris, Rebecca Isaacs, Simon Peter, Timothy Roscoe, Adrian Schüpbach, and Akhilesh Singhania. The multikernel: A new OS architecture for scalable multicore systems. In *Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles*, Big Sky, MT, USA, October 2009. ACM.
- [Boy09] Andrew Boyton. A verified shared capability model. In Gerwin Klein, Ralf Huuck, and Bastian Schlich, editors, Proceedings of the 4th Workshop on Systems Software Verification, volume 254 of Electronic Notes in Computer Science, pages 25–44, Aachen, Germany, October 2009. Elsevier.
- [BSC<sup>+</sup>11] Bernard Blackham, Yao Shi, Sudipta Chattopadhyay, Abhik Roychoudhury, and Gernot Heiser. Timing analysis of a protected operating system kernel. In *IEEE Real-Time Systems Symposium*, pages 339–348, Vienna, Austria, November 2011.
- [BSH12] Bernard Blackham, Yao Shi, and Gernot Heiser. Improving interrupt response time in a verifiable protected microkernel. In *EuroSys*, pages 323– 336, Bern, Switzerland, April 2012.
- [CKS08] David Cock, Gerwin Klein, and Thomas Sewell. Secure microkernels, state monads and scalable refinement. In Otmane Ait Mohamed, César Muñoz, and Sofiène Tahar, editors, Proceedings of the 21st International Conference on Theorem Proving in Higher Order Logics, volume 5170 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 167–182, Montreal, Canada, August 2008. Springer-Verlag.
- [DEK<sup>+</sup>06] Philip Derrin, Kevin Elphinstone, Gerwin Klein, David Cock, and Manuel M. T. Chakravarty. Running the manual: An approach to high-assurance microkernel development. In *Proceedings of the ACM SIGPLAN Haskell* Workshop, Portland, OR, USA, September 2006.
- [EKE08] Dhammika Elkaduwe, Gerwin Klein, and Kevin Elphinstone. Verified protection model of the seL4 microkernel. In Jim Woodcock and Natarajan Shankar, editors, Proceedings of Verified Software: Theories, Tools and Experiments 2008, volume 5295 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 99–114, Toronto, Canada, October 2008. Springer-Verlag.
- [Int11] Intel Corporation. Intel Virtualization Technology for Directed I/O — Architecture Specification, February 2011. http://download.intel.com/ technology/computing/vptech/Intel(r)\_VT\_for\_Direct\_IO.pdf.

- [KEH<sup>+</sup>09] Gerwin Klein, Kevin Elphinstone, Gernot Heiser, June Andronick, David Cock, Philip Derrin, Dhammika Elkaduwe, Kai Engelhardt, Rafal Kolanski, Michael Norrish, Thomas Sewell, Harvey Tuch, and Simon Winwood. seL4: Formal verification of an OS kernel. In *Proceedings of the 22nd ACM* Symposium on Operating Systems Principles, pages 207–220, Big Sky, MT, USA, October 2009. ACM.
- [MMB<sup>+</sup>13] Toby Murray, Daniel Matichuk, Matthew Brassil, Peter Gammie, Timothy Bourke, Sean Seefried, Corey Lewis, Xin Gao, and Gerwin Klein. seL4: from general purpose to a proof of information flow enforcement. In *IEEE Symposium on Security & Privacy*, pages 415–429, San Francisco, CA, May 2013.
- [Pal09] Ameya Palande. Capability-based secure DMA in seL4. Masters thesis, Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, January 2009.
- [SA99] Tom Shanley and Don Anderson. *PCI System Architecture*. Mindshare, Inc., 1999.
- [SWG<sup>+</sup>11] Thomas Sewell, Simon Winwood, Peter Gammie, Toby Murray, June Andronick, and Gerwin Klein. seL4 enforces integrity. In Marko van Eekelen, Herman Geuvers, Julien Schmaltz, and Freek Wiedijk, editor, *Interactive Theorem Proving (ITP)*, pages 325–340, Nijmegen, The Netherlands, August 2011.
- [TKN07] Harvey Tuch, Gerwin Klein, and Michael Norrish. Types, bytes, and separation logic. In Martin Hofmann and Matthias Felleisen, editors, Proceedings of the 34th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages, pages 97–108, Nice, France, January 2007. ACM.
- [vT10] Michael von Tessin. Towards high-assurance multiprocessor virtualisation. In Markus Aderhold, Serge Autexier, and Heiko Mantel, editors, Proceedings of the 6th International Verification Workshop, volume 3 of Easy-Chair Proceedings in Computing, pages 110–125, Edinburgh, UK, July 2010. EasyChair.
- [vT12] Michael von Tessin. The clustered multikernel: An approach to formal verification of multiprocessor OS kernels. In Proceedings of the 2nd Workshop on Systems for Future Multi-core Architectures, Bern, Switzerland, April 2012.
- [WKS<sup>+</sup>09] Simon Winwood, Gerwin Klein, Thomas Sewell, June Andronick, David Cock, and Michael Norrish. Mind the gap: A verification framework for low-level C. In Stefan Berghofer, Tobias Nipkow, Christian Urban, and Makarius Wenzel, editors, Proceedings of the 22nd International Conference on Theorem Proving in Higher Order Logics, volume 5674 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 500–515, Munich, Germany, August 2009. Springer-Verlag.